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ABSTRACT 
 
U.S. money market securities have been found to exhibit behavior consistent with preferred 
habitat for liquidity around year-ends (Griffiths and Winters (1997, 2004)). In particular, 
repurchase agreement and commercial paper yields tend to increase when the security 
begins to mature across the end of the year, and return to normal levels after the year-end 
obligations have been paid but before the calendar year-end. The competing hypothesis, window 
dressing by financial intermediaries around disclosure dates, requires that the increase in 
yields be sustained until after the turn of the year. This study is aimed at finding whether the 
behavior of international money markets around year-ends and quarter-ends is more consistent 
with preferred habitat for liquidity or window dressing. This is done by analyzing changes in 
LIBOR for different currencies around quarter-ends. 
A second part of the study considers the effect of preferred habitat on the term structure of 
short-term interest rates. The expectations hypothesis of the term structure posits that future 
expected interest rates are implied by the current term structure. Empirical research suggests that 
the expectations hypothesis often does not hold, especially at the short end of the term structure. 
Preferred habitat for liquidity in short-term rates may be one of the reasons for the failure of 
expectations. The same LIBOR data set is used to test for the expectations in the presence of 
preferred habitat for liquidity. The empirical results of this study suggest that preferred habitat 
for liquidity in the short-term rates around quarter-ends and year-ends is not responsible for the 
failure of the expectations hypothesis in the data.  
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PART 1. PREFERRED HABITAT FOR LIQUIDITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES 
 
1.1 Introduction and Literature Review 
 Pricing or valuing various securities is the cornerstone of the discipline of finance. 
Naturally, the concept of efficient markets is central to finance theory since market efficiency 
implies an environment in which assets may be priced correctly, according to their 
fundamental values. Any unusual patterns in security prices and/or volatilities will sooner or 
later be identified and draw attention of the academic world. These patterns may be 
associated with various characteristics of securities (e.g., size), markets (e.g., trading rules), 
general economic conditions, etc. Regularities that have not been rationally explained are 
labeled anomalies. The following literature review concentrates on the patterns associated 
with calendar times, particularly on those related to month-, quarter-, and year-ends. It does 
not extend to cover day-of-the-week and intraday regularities in security returns in order to 
maintain the desired focus of the study. 
 
1.1.2 Empirical Studies 
Time-based anomalies have been detected in different securities around the turn of a 
calendar period such as a year, quarter, month, week, and even a day (the extensive market 
microstructure literature deals with intraday data). This study focuses on the behavior of 
money market instruments at the turn of the quarter and year. Behavior of various securities 
around month-ends, quarter-ends, and year-ends has attracted a lot of academic attention in 
the past two and a half decades. For example, Reinganum (1981) documents that small firms 
outperform large firms on a risk-adjusted basis at the turn of the year; Jordan and Jordan 
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(1991) find a turn of the year effect in bonds; and Park and Reinganum (1986) report that T-
bills maturing just before the end of the month, especially just before the end of the year, 
have lower yields than adjacent maturity T-bills. 
Banz (1981) studies the relationship between market capitalization and common stock 
returns. He finds that, for the period 1936 through 1975, common stocks of small firms had, 
on average, higher risk-adjusted returns than common stocks of large firms. The identified 
size effect is not linear in market value: the difference is most striking between returns of 
very small firms and large firms, while it is much less significant between average sized and 
large firms. Risk has been controlled for by grouping securities into five beta quintiles and 
analyzing the size effects within these portfolios. The results do not reveal whether size itself 
drives excess returns or size is just correlated with some other factors that could explain the 
phenomenon. One conjecture expressed by Banz is that lack of information about small firms 
leads to limited diversification and therefore to higher returns on less desirable small stocks. 
He also notes that the size effect implies a misspecification of the traditional CAPM, since it 
improves the explanatory power of the model.  
Reinganum (1981) constructs portfolios of common stocks based on E/P ratios and 
market values. He finds that low E/P portfolios and low market value portfolios earn 
abnormally high returns on a persistent basis. When studying the two factors together, 
Reinganum finds that the abnormal returns of high E/P portfolios become insignificant after 
controlling for size, while the abnormal returns of low market value portfolios remain 
significant after controlling for the E/P ratio. Thus the identified phenomenon in the behavior 
of returns is likely to be more closely associated with (or driven by) market values than E/P 
ratios. Reinganum, like Banz (1981), notes that his findings can be interpreted either as a sign 
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of a misspecification of the CAPM or evidence of market inefficiency, and tends to favor the 
former interpretation because persistency of the results over time is unlikely to be a result of 
market inefficiency. 
Keim (1983) focuses on empirical month-by-month relations between market value and 
abnormal returns. He shows that, for the period 1963 through 1979, the major portion of size-
related abnormal returns is driven by January abnormal returns. While January abnormal 
returns are responsible for about fifty percent of the “size effect”, more than a half of the 
January premium is attributable to the first five trading days in a year. The relationship 
between market value and returns is negative and more pronounced in January than in any 
other month, even in years when large firms outperform small firms on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Taking into account the critique of Roll (1981), Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson 
(1979), all of whom argue that small stocks’ betas may be underestimated due to infrequent 
trading, Keim uses three different beta estimates (OLS beta, Scholes-Williams beta, and 
Dimson beta) but finds that the size effect is not sensitive to different estimators of beta. This 
is consistent with Reinganum (1982), who reports that, although small stocks’ OLS betas 
tend to be underestimated, confirming Roll’s (1981) conjecture, this does not eliminate a 
pronounced negative relation between abnormal returns and firm size.  
Keim offers (but does not test) two possible explanation of the January effect: the tax-loss 
selling and the information hypothesis. Tax-loss selling refers to investors selling loser stocks 
in the end of the year in order to reduce capital gains tax; the information hypothesis states 
that the time after the fiscal year-end (December 31 for most firms) is a period of increased 
uncertainty due to impending release of important information. 
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Chan and Chen (1988), however, show that the size effect is insignificant when betas are 
estimated over the long run. The “size effect” is observed if only five years of data are used 
to estimate betas; it disappears when data for a long period of time are used to estimate betas. 
This finding implies that the January effect is a return seasonality rather than a result of a 
misspecification of the CAPM.  
Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) analyze returns on NASDAQ stocks over the period 1973-
1985. OTC-traded firms are on average much smaller than exchange-listed companies; also, 
a portfolio of smallest NASDAQ firms will not predominantly consist of stocks whose value 
has declined recently, contrary to the portfolio of exchange-listed smallest firms. A 
monotonic inverse relation between firm size and January excess returns is found, which 
implies that the January effect in stocks cannot be explained by institutional features of 
exchanges. Transactions costs are large enough to preclude investors from profitably 
exploiting the turn-of-the-year seasonality in small OTC-traded stocks. 
Jordan and Jordan (1991) test for seasonal patterns in corporate bond returns and 
compare them to the seasonal patterns previously identified in equities. They identify several 
seasonalities in the bond markets using the Dow Jones Composite Bond Average. Corporate 
bonds exhibit significant turn-of-the-year and week-of-the-month effects (the highest mean 
return occurs in the second week of the month; week 4 has the lowest return). A January 
effect also exists but it is less strong than in equities. The turn-of-the-year effect being 
significant in both stocks and bonds lends credence to an explanation of the phenomenon that 
is general to fixed-income and equity markets. 
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1.1.3 Explanations of Month-, Quarter-, and Year-end Regularities 
Three different, but not mutually exclusive hypotheses have been dominant in the 
literature attempting to explain these phenomena: the tax-loss selling (e.g., Roll (1983)), the 
window dressing (Haugen and Lakonishok (1988)), and the preferred habitat (Ogden (1987)). 
Empirical studies provide some support for all three of them: tax-loss selling (Jones et al. 
(1991), Griffiths and White (1993)), window dressing (Lakonishok et al. (1991), Allen and 
Saunders (1992)), and preferred habitat (Ogden (1987, 1990), Griffiths and Winters (1997, 
2004)) in various markets. 
 
1.1.3.1 Tax-loss Selling 
The tax-loss selling hypothesis states that investors who want to realize capital losses in 
the current tax year dispose of stocks that have recently declined in value, thus putting 
downward pressure on prices. 
Roll (1983) shows that over the period 1963 through 1981, the five largest daily mean 
return differences between an equally weighted and a value-weighted CRSP indexes 
occurred on five consecutive days: the last trading day of December and the first four trading 
days of January. About 37% of the return differential is attributable to these five days, and 
67% of it occurs on the first 20 trading days of January, plus the last trading day in 
December. This implies that small firms outperform large firms over the course of the year, 
and the bulk of the “size effect” occurs on the five consecutive days commencing with the 
last trading day of December. Roll goes on to show that there is a significant negative 
relation between the turn-of-the-year return and the preceding year return on the stock. This 
is consistent with tax-loss selling at the end of the calendar year followed by a rebound in 
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prices when the selling pressure subsides after the turn of the year. Small stocks are more 
likely to experience substantial negative returns over some period of time due to the mere 
fact that they are much more volatile than stocks of large firms. A closer look at transaction 
costs and liquidity of such stocks may explain why the turn-of-the-year effect is not 
arbitraged away. 
Ritter (1988) notes that, although the tax-loss selling accounts for a large part of 
abnormal January returns of small stocks, it does not explain the high January returns for 
small stocks that have not declined in value thus presenting investors with an opportunity to 
realize capital losses. He proposes the parking-the-proceeds hypothesis that focuses on 
buying and selling behavior of individuals around the turn of the year: some of the proceeds 
from December sales may not be reinvested immediately, but “parked” until January. The 
hypothesis requires that individual investors hold more of low-priced, low-capitalization 
stocks (Blume and Friend (1983)) whose prices are more dependent on buying and selling 
pressure (Lakonishok and Smidt (1984)), and do not reinvest the proceeds from tax-loss sales 
immediately in the same or different stocks. Using the buy/sell ratio for individual investors 
at Merrill Lynch, Ritter demonstrates that December’s net selling transforms into net buying 
at the turn of the year, which is consistent with the proposed parking-the-proceeds 
hypothesis. This framework is capable of explaining why small stocks do well at the turn of 
the year; however, it cannot explain why small stocks outperform large stocks over the 
course of the year. 
Jones, Lee, and Apenbrink (1991) test whether the turn-of-the-year effect was present in 
common equities before the introduction of the U.S. personal income tax in 1917 under the 
War Revenue Act. Using an equally weighted Cowles Industrial Index, they find that the 
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turn-of-the year returns on this index are not significantly different from the returns for the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average in the pretax period; however, the difference becomes 
significant after the introduction of personal income taxes. Also, stocks with relatively high 
tax-loss potential earned a significantly higher turn-of-the-year returns in the post-tax period. 
Similar results hold for low-price stocks versus high-price stocks. The findings relate the 
January effect to the existence of income taxes; however, they do not provide a complete 
solution for the size effect.  
Griffiths and White (1993) compare the turn-of-the-year effects in the U.S. and Canadian 
markets using intraday data. The tax year in Canada effectively ends five days prior to the 
calendar year-end, inducing investors who want to realize tax losses to trade at least five days 
before the calendar year-end. By analyzing whether transactions occur at bid or ask prices, 
Griffiths and White conclude that there is significant selling pressure before the tax year-end 
(most transactions occur at the bid price), with a shift to the buying pressure after the tax 
year-end when most transactions occur at the ask price in both countries. The findings 
provide further support for the tax-loss selling hypothesis and are consistent with the 
parking-the-proceeds hypothesis of Ritter (1988).  
 
1.1.3.2 Window Dressing 
Window dressing is essentially an attempt by disclosing entities to disguise the 
composition of their holdings by investing (disinvesting) disproportionately in some assets 
on or right before disclosure dates. This activity is temporary in nature, as window dressers 
are expected to reverse their positions after a disclosure date. Lakonishok et al. (1991) 
investigate whether pension fund managers are involved in window dressing around quarter-
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ends and year-ends. Selling losers or buying winners before disclosure dates is a sign of 
window dressing. The results suggest that funds predominantly use the contrarian strategy 
(buy losers and sell winners) except they get rid of mistakes. Dumping loser stocks is more 
typical of smaller funds, probably because it is too hard to fool sophisticated investors of 
larger funds by window dressing. Overall, the findings are indicative of modest window 
dressing by some funds.  
Allen and Saunders (1992) analyze behavior of bank assets around (quarterly) disclosure 
dates, and interpret increases in the level of some asset categories (e.g., Fed funds) as a clear 
sign of window dressing by banks. Turn-of-the-quarter increases in some liabilities (e.g., 
transaction deposits) are viewed by the authors as possible evidence of window dressing by 
bank customers.  
 Musto (1997) finds that commercial paper maturing in the next calendar year sells at an 
extra discount while T-bills do not. For example, in the data used, the 30-day commercial 
paper rate is 47 basis points higher just before the year-end than just after. The discount is 
even bigger for paper with higher default risk. He also finds quarter-end discounts, but no 
month-end discounts. The patterns for quarter-ends are similar to the year-end, although on a 
smaller scale. These results are interpreted by Musto as a sign of window dressing by 
intermediaries who do not want to have commercial paper on books on the year-end 
disclosure date, December 31. The argument is that intermediaries switch to riskless 
securities in an attempt of “flight-from-risk” across the year-end. By doing so, the 
intermediaries underrepresent the riskiness of their portfolios to investors on disclosure dates.   
Musto (1999) studies weekly allocations of money market funds among various 
categories of securities. He notes that retail funds tend to hold larger proportions of assets in 
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riskless government securities around disclosure dates (every six months). On average, retail 
funds hold 0.3% of portfolio value more in government securities during disclosures than on 
other dates, with the difference being statistically significant. These reallocations are 
interpreted as a sign of window dressing. Because 0.3% is a small change to materially affect 
investors’ decision, it is likely that the results are driven by few funds tilting their portfolios 
more toward riskless securities around disclosure dates. Partitioning the sample of retail 
funds into size categories does not yield any significant results, while categorizing funds with 
respect to their recent performance reveals that relatively poor performers tend to window 
dress more. The reason for such funds to window dress is perhaps that investors do not know 
whether low money-fund returns are due to poor performance or low risk. Still, given the 
small magnitude of the results, it is likely that only very few funds engage in window 
dressing around disclosures. Institutional funds (those with large minimum investments) do 
not tilt their portfolios toward government securities on disclosure dates. The offered 
explanation is that their clients can afford to buy weekly money fund reports, which is 
uneconomical for individual investors. 
 
1.1.3.3 Preferred Habitat 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966) developed the preferred habitat hypothesis to add to the 
explanation of the term structure of interest rates. The preferred habitat can be viewed as a 
variant of the market segmentation hypothesis of the term structure. The proponents of 
markets segmentation argue that investors have clearly defined preferences for instruments of 
certain maturities and stick to those maturities due to risk aversion. Institutional and 
regulatory constraints may determine such preferences. The preferred habitat hypothesis is 
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more flexible in that it states that investors can be induced into different maturities given 
large enough differences in yields.  
Park and Reinganum (1986) document that T-bills maturing at the ends of calendar 
months have significantly lower yields than T-bills maturing at the beginning of calendar 
months. This difference is especially large at the turn of the year. Although the authors 
suggest some potential explanations, they declare such behavior of T-bill yields puzzling.  
Ogden (1987) relates the phenomenon identified by Park and Reinganum to the aggregate 
preferred habitat for lenders at the ends of calendar months. He points out that about 70 
percent of the interest and principal payments on corporate debt and 38 percent of dividend 
payments on common stocks are made either on the last or on the first business day of the 
month. Other contractually scheduled payments such as wages and salaries occur on these 
dates thus suggesting that an aggregate preferred habitat may influence yields of money 
market securities maturing at the turn-of-the-month. The analysis of T-bill yields conducted 
by Ogden supports the preferred habitat hypothesis: a preference by corporations and other 
institutions for the last bill maturing in a month results in lower yields for such bills relative 
to bills maturing a week later. Moreover, the interest rate differential between the first bill 
maturing in a month and the last bill maturing in the previous month widens as the latter 
matures closer to the end of the month.  
  Simon (1991) examines cash management T-bills which represent unexpected 
additional supplies of outstanding T-bills, and shows that the segmentation in the T-bill 
market is not limited to month-end preferred habitats.1 He finds that such announcements 
                                                 
1 In order to study only unexpected cash management issues, Simon excluded bills auctioned in place of 
regularly scheduled actions delayed due to debt ceiling constraints. 
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generally lead to an increase in cash management bill yields but do not influence adjacent 
maturity bill yields. During the sample period (1980 through 1988), the spread between cash 
management bill yields and the average of the two adjacent T-bill yields had increased on 
average by a statistically and economically significant 35 basis points from one day before to 
nine days after the announcement. The changes in the spreads are more pronounced for short 
maturity cash management bills, which implies that the segmentation is greater at the short 
end of the market. The unwillingness of market participants to reshuffle their portfolios to 
take advantage of arbitrage opportunities apparently reflects preferred habitats that extend 
beyond the end of the month. 
Simon (1994) presents additional evidence on segmentation in the T-bill market by 
examining the yield differences between 13-week and 12-week T-bills. Some 12-week and 
13-week issues represent additional supplies of previously auctioned 26- or 52-week bills. 
Controlling for factors that were previously identified to have influence on T-bill yield 
differentials (the slope of the yield curve, month-end preferred habitats, and cash 
management issues), Simon finds that the yield spreads between 13-week and 12-week bills 
are affected by differences in supply of these bills. In particular, yields on bills that originate 
as 52-week bills are about 4 basis points higher than they otherwise would be. Investors 
placing new funds in such issues would have an extra return of $100 on each $1 million. The 
fact that these yield differences are not arbitraged by market participants is interpreted as 
evidence of further segmentation of the T-bill market. 
Griffiths and Winters (1997) use daily data on term repo rates to analyze the year-end 
regularity in the money markets. They start by reporting that one-, two-, and three-week repo 
spreads decline significantly in the last two trading days of the year, and the declines 
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continue through the first four trading days of the new year. This result rejects window 
dressing at the turn of the year. The direction of the spread changes contradicts idle cash 
window dressing (that is, an attempt to show little cash on books on disclosure dates to 
appear more efficient), while the timing of these changes is inconsistent with either the idle 
cash or the flight from risk variant of window dressing. Griffiths and Winters proceed to 
show that these turn-of-the-year declines in spreads are actually preceded by significant 
increases. The term repo spreads over the 91-day T-bill yield jump when the maturity of the 
instrument spans the end of the year. 2 For example, the two-week repo spreads over the T-
bills are significantly higher on days -10 through -1 relative to the year-end than on other 
trading days. Trading day -10 represents the first day when maturity of the two-week repo 
spans the year-end. Similar patterns are observed for one-week, two-week, and one-month 
repos, but not in overnight or longer term repos. The findings cannot be consistent with year-
end window dressing by institutions because of the timing and direction of spread changes, 
but are in line with the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity (Ogden (1987)). That is, 
investors prefer money-market securities that mature prior to the calendar year-end, so that 
they can fulfill their year-end obligations. Securities that mature across the end of the year 
will sell at a deeper discount due to lower investor demand for these maturities. Griffiths and 
Winters believe that this turn-of-the-year liquidity premium reflects preference for cash at the 
year-end. The demand for the securities should rebound after year-end obligations are paid 
and some cash is left over. This does not have to occur after the calendar year-end but can 
actually start one or several business days prior to that. This is exactly the pattern identified 
                                                 
2 The 91-day T-bill was chosen because neither Musto (1997) nor Griffiths and Winters (1997) found any 
year-end regularity in this data series.  
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by Griffiths and Winters: the yields start falling back to normal levels before the calendar 
year-end, on trading day -1; the decline continues in the first few trading days of the new 
year.  
Griffiths and Winters (2004) revisit the commercial paper market and find evidence that 
enables them to reject turn-of-the-year risk-shifting window dressing proposed by Musto 
(1997). Their results are consistent with year-end preferred habitat for liquidity due to year-
end cash-flow obligations. This is similar to the findings of Griffiths and Winters (1997) for 
term repos. Griffiths and Winters (2004) study yield changes at the turn of the year more 
thoroughly and find that the decline in yields occurs prior to the calendar year-end. In 
particular, they find a significant rate decrease in a one-month CP over the last two trading 
days in December. Under the risk-shifting window dressing hypothesis, however, the yield 
increase must be sustained throughout the last trading day of the year because the hypothesis 
is that window dressers do not want to disclose risky positions in their year-end reports and 
thus must remain out of the risky security until after the year-end reporting date (12/31). 
Alternatively, under the preferred habitat hypothesis, the yield change patterns do not have to 
be perfectly aligned with the calendar year-end. Extending the analysis of rate changes to 
private-issue money market instruments with the original maturity of one month (banker’s 
acceptances, negotiable CDs, Eurodollar deposits, and LIBOR), Griffiths and Winters find 
similar yield change patterns: the rates increase significantly in the last two trading days of 
November (this is just before a one-month instrument begins to mature across the year-end), 
followed by a return to “normal” levels in the last two trading days of December.  
Griffiths and Winters (2003) extend the analysis of Griffiths and Winters (2004) by using 
spreads between different risk classes to determine if the price of risk increases at the end of 
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the year. They collect daily rates on 7-day, 15-day, and 30-day non-financial commercial 
paper for the two risk categories, AA and A2/P2, for the period 7/1/97 through 6/30/02. The 
year-end patterns for each maturity are consistent with those identified by Griffiths and 
Winters (2004). In addition, the spread between AA and A2/P2 commercial paper yields 
behaves similarly to the rates themselves. That is, the spread widens when maturities of the 
instruments start to span the turn of the year, and it returns to normal levels prior to the 
calendar year-end. For example, the 15-day average risk spread increases from 29 basis 
points on trading day -11 to 78 basis points on trading day -9 relative to the year-end. It 
returns to 27 basis points on trading day -1. These results suggest that there is an increased 
price for risk at the turn of the year, with the timing of the spread changes being consistent 
with preferred habitat for liquidity but not with risk-shifting window dressing. 
Ogden (1990) notes that a standardization of the payments system in the U.S. may help 
explain the monthly effect identified by Ariel (1987). Ariel documents that virtually all of the 
cumulative returns on value weighted and equally weighted stock indexes, over the period 
from 1963 through 1981, are realized on the ten trading days starting with the last trading day 
of the month and ending with the ninth trading day of the following month. Lakonishok and 
Smidt (1988) find that for the Dow Jones Industrial Average, significant daily returns are 
realized only on four consecutive trading days starting with the last trading day of the month. 
Ogden’s proposed explanation is that investors, many of whom have substantial cash receipts 
at the turn of the month, will increase their demand for stocks at the time. He also 
hypothesizes that expected liquid profits at the turn of the month are inversely related with 
the stringency of monetary policy (measured by the spread of the Fed funds rate over the 
one-month T-bill rate). This hypothesis is supported by Ogden’s analysis of the CRSP stock 
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index returns (both value-weighted and equally weighted) for the period from 1969 through 
1986.  
 
1.1.4 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to further develop the investigation of time-based anomalies 
in short-term debt markets. In particular, the main goal is to determine whether year-end and 
quarter-end effects in short-term interest rates exist for debt instruments denominated in 
currencies other than the U.S. dollar. Since short-term rates reflect yields of money market 
instruments which have low default and interest rate risk, tax-loss selling is not likely to be a 
plausible explanation for the turn-of-the-year effect in these markets. Therefore we are left 
with two major hypotheses: window dressing by market participants and quarter-end/year-
end preferred habitat for liquidity. Although these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, one 
of the explanations may dominate in any particular market. If the flight-from-risk variant of 
window dressing by intermediaries and other money market participants dominates around 
quarter- and year-ends, then short-term interest rates are expected to increase at these times 
and to return to normal levels after the end of the calendar quarter/year. If idle-cash window 
dressing is the driving force of the turn-of-the-quarter effect, short-term interest rates should 
decrease before and return to normal levels after the end of the calendar period. Under 
quarter-end/year-end preferred habitat for liquidity, interest rates for short-term securities 
would increase at the time when maturity of the instrument starts to span the end of the 
quarter or year, and return to normal levels after the quarter- or year-end cash obligations 
have been fulfilled. If many market participants have financial commitments on or 
immediately before the end of the quarter, they would prefer to invest in money-market 
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securities that mature just prior to the quarter-end. To induce these investors to purchase 
securities maturing in the next quarter, a premium would have to be offered. By the analogy 
with Griffiths and Winters (1997), such a premium will be labeled the quarter-end liquidity 
premium, and the phenomenon will be referred to as the quarter-end preferred habitat for 
liquidity. The premium may disappear before the end of the quarter/year, as long as cash 
obligations are fulfilled and free funds are available to be reinvested. In fact, evidence 
presented in Griffiths and Winters (1997, 2003, 2004) demonstrates that this is the pattern 
exhibited by the yields of the U.S. money market instruments. 
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1.2 Data and Methods 
 
1.2.1 Data 
The data are daily short-term London Interbank Offer Rates (LIBOR) for different 
currencies and maturities; they were obtained from the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) 
website. The time periods vary for different currencies and maturities.  
BBA LIBOR is the primary benchmark for short term interest rates globally. It is used as 
the basis for settlement of interest rate contracts on many of the world's major futures and 
options exchanges including London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange 
(LIFFE), Deutsche Term Burse, Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, 
Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), and Tokyo International Financial 
Futures Exchange (TIFFE), as well as most over the counter (OTC) and lending transactions. 
It is compiled by the BBA in conjunction with Moneyline Telerate and released to the market 
shortly after 11:00AM London time each trading day.  
The following is an excerpt from the definition of the BBA LIBOR fixing:  
BBA LIBOR is the BBA fixing of the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate. It is based on 
offered inter-bank deposit rates contributed in accordance with the Instructions to BBA 
LIBOR Contributor Banks. The BBA consults on the BBA LIBOR rate fixing process with the 
BBA LIBOR Steering Group. The BBA LIBOR Steering Group comprises leading market 
practitioners active in the inter-bank money markets in London. 
Contributor Panels shall comprise at least eight Contributor Banks.3 Contributor Panels 
will broadly reflect the balance of activity in the inter-bank deposit market. Individual 
Contributor Banks are selected by the BBA’s FX & Money Markets Advisory Panel after 
private nomination and discussions with the Steering Group, on the basis of reputation, scale 
of activity in the London market and perceived expertise in the currency concerned, and 
                                                 
3 Of course, contributor panels are different for different currencies. As of July 23, 2002, for example, the 
contributor panels for Australian Dollar, New Zealand Dollar, and Danish Krone were comprised of eight 
banks, for Canadian Dollar and Swiss Frank – of 12 banks, and for Euro, Pound Sterling, Japanese Yen, 
and U.S. dollar – of 16 banks. 
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giving due consideration to credit standing. The BBA, in consultation with the BBA LIBOR 
Steering Group, will review the composition of the Contributor Panels at least annually.  
Contributed rates will be ranked in order and only the middle two quartiles averaged 
arithmetically.4 Such average rate will be the BBA LIBOR Fixing for that particular 
currency, maturity and fixing date. Individual Contributor Panel Bank rates will be released 
shortly after publication of the average rate. In the event that it is not possible to conduct the 
BBA LIBOR Fixing in the usual way, the BBA, in consultation with Contributor Banks, the 
BBA LIBOR Steering Group and other market practitioners, will use its best efforts to set a 
substitute rate. This will be the BBA LIBOR Fixing for the currency, maturity and fixing date 
in question. Such substitute fixing will be communicated to the market in a timely fashion. An 
individual BBA LIBOR Contributor Panel Bank has to contribute the rate at which it could 
borrow funds, were it to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in 
reasonable market size just prior to 11a.m. 
 
BBA LIBOR's London base is very significant: well over 20% of all international bank 
lending and more than 30% of all foreign exchange transactions take place through the 
offices of banks in London; it represents a unique snapshot of competitive funding costs. 
Close to 500 banks are represented in London, along with many other major financial 
institutions actively trading in the Euromarkets, which are based primarily in London. In 
addition, no reserve requirements are applied in London. Currently, BBA LIBOR fixings are 
provided in nine international currencies: Pound Sterling (GBP), U.S. Dollar (USD), 
Japanese Yen (JPY), Swiss Franc (SF), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Australian Dollar (AUD), 
Euro, Danish Krone (DK), and New Zealand Dollar (NZD).5 LIBOR rates are fixed for each 
of these currencies in 15 maturities: overnight, one week, two weeks, and one month through 
twelve months. The BBA commenced fixing overnight rates (for GBP, EUR, CAD and USD) 
and spot/next rates (for AUD, SF and JPY) on January 2, 2001. The two-week LIBOR has 
also been fixed since the beginning of 2001, while the one-week LIBOR has been reported 
since the beginning of 1998. The euro-in zone currency LIBOR (those eventually replaced by 
                                                 
4 This implies that daily LIBOR are not influenced by large liquidity squeezes/excesses in one bank. 
5 LIBOR fixings for Danish Krone and New Zealand Dollar commenced in July 2003. These currencies are 
not included in the analysis due to the short data period. 
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the Euro – German Mark, French Franc, Spanish Peseta, Italian Lira, Dutch Guilder, and 
Irish Punt) ceased to be fixed at the beginning of 1999. The first four out of these six 
currencies have been included in the analysis in this study. The primary focus of this work is 
on the shorter maturities, especially one week and one month, as it has been found in the past 
that these maturities exhibit the most noticeable year-end and quarter-end effects. 
Table 1. Data periods for LIBOR currencies and maturities 
   Maturities 
 
Currencies 
Abbrevia- 
tions One day One week Two weeks 
One-twelve 
months 
U.S. Dollar USD 1/01-3/04 1/98-3/04 1/01-3/04 1/87-3/04 
British Pound  GBP 1/01-3/04 1/98-3/04 1/01-3/04 1/87-3/04 
Australian Dollar AUD 1/01-3/04 1/98-3/04 1/01-3/04 1/89-3/04 
Swiss Franc SF 1/01-3/04 1/98-3/04 1/01-3/04 1/89-3/04 
Euro - 1/01-3/04 1/98-3/04 1/01-3/04 1/89-3/04 
Japanese Yen JPY 1/01-3/04 1/98-3/04 1/01-3/04 1/89-3/04 
Canadian Dollar CAD 1/01-3/04 1/98-3/04 1/01-3/04 7/90-3/04 
German Mark DM N/A 1/98-12/98 N/A 1/87-12/98 
French Franc FF N/A 1/98-12/98 N/A 1/89-12/98 
Spanish Peseta SP N/A 1/98-12/98 N/A 7/90-12/98 
Italian Lira ITL N/A 1/98-12/98 N/A 7/90-12/98 
 
Table 1 summarizes the data periods for different LIBOR currencies and maturities. It 
also contains currency abbreviations used throughout the paper.6  
Overall, BBA LIBOR probably represents the widest possible range of maturities for 
money-market securities. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for LIBOR for monthly 
maturities of the 11 currencies included in the analysis.   
 Interest rates in all of the countries included in the analysis were much lower in the 
second half of the data periods than in the first several years. A glance at Table 2 confirms 
this statement: the difference between the average one-month LIBOR (available since 
                                                 
6 Although the Euro came into existence in the beginning of 1998 for interbank payments and in the 
beginning of 2002 for cash payments, BBA LIBOR fixings have commenced for its predecessor, European 
Currency Unit (ECU), in January 1989. Thus, when we refer to the Euro, we also refer to its predecessor. 
 19
 20
January 1987, January 1989, or July 1990, depending on the currency) and the average one-
day LIBOR (available since 2001) is very dramatic varying from the low of 89 basis points 
for the Euro to the high of 351 basis points for the British Pound.  
The term structures for the maturities of one through twelve months have been upward 
sloping for the first eight currencies in Tables 1 and 2. The yield curves increase 
monotonically for all of these currencies except the Euro which has a flat interval for 
maturities between three through nine months. The yield curve for the USD has the steepest 
slope, while that for Euro is closest to flat among the first eight currencies. In the case of the 
French Franc, the term structure becomes inverted after maturity reaches three months, 
although it is closest to flat among all currencies. For two other Euro-in zone currencies, 
Spanish Peseta and Italian Lira, the yield curves are downward sloping on the short end, but 
they become virtually flat after maturity reaches six months. 
Figures 1 through 3 plot the yield curves for maturities of one through twelve months for 
each of the currencies included in the analysis. Figure 1 depicts the yield curves for USD and 
GBP, Figure 2 contains the yield curves for AUD, SF, Euro, JPY, and CAD, and Figure 3 – 
for the currencies eventually replaced by the Euro (DM, FF, SP, and ITL). This division is 
not completely arbitrary: USD and GBP LIBOR are available for the period from 1/87 
through 3/04, while the data period for the currencies in Figure 2 is 1/89 through 3/04 (with 
the exception of CAD for which LIBOR fixings commenced in 7/90). The third figure 
includes the currencies whose LIBOR data availability extends only through 12/98. 
While yield curves in Figures 1 through 3 may have positive or negative slopes or be 
close to flat, they represent averages over the period of data availability. At any given point 
in time, yield curves may have looked quite differently from those in the figures. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for different LIBOR currencies and maturities 
  Maturities 
Currencies 
One 
day 
One 
week 
Two 
weeks 
1   
month 
2 
months 
3 
months 
4 
months 
5 
months 
6 
months 
7 
months 
8 
months 
9 
months 
10 
months 
11 
months 
12 
months 
U.S. Dollar                               
-Observations                798 1579 822 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363 4363
-Mean               2.220 3.874 2.204 5.281 5.326 5.361 5.389 5.419 5.446 5.480 5.513 5.547 5.585 5.623 5.661
-St. deviation               1.431 2.049 1.378 2.204 2.215 2.224 2.226 2.230 2.232 2.234 2.234 2.236 2.233 2.230 2.228
British Pound                                
- Observations                822 1579 822 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362 4362
-Mean               4.214 5.147 4.230 7.730 7.772 7.795 7.802 7.814 7.823 7.837 7.850 7.861 7.881 7.900 7.916
-St. deviation               0.858 1.279 0.691 3.305 3.298 3.284 3.266 3.245 3.226 3.205 3.184 3.162 3.143 3.124 3.106
Australian Dollar                               
- Observations                821 1579 822 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855
-Mean               4.830 5.045 4.844 7.275 7.295 7.307 7.322 7.339 7.361 7.389 7.420 7.453 7.485 7.523 7.568
-St. deviation               0.401 0.514 0.399 3.722 3.730 3.718 3.702 3.688 3.681 3.671 3.663 3.654 3.644 3.638 3.680
Swiss Franc                               
- Observations                822 1579 822 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855
-Mean               1.368 1.560 1.372 3.796 3.827 3.849 3.857 3.864 3.872 3.877 3.883 3.889 3.899 3.908 3.920
-St. deviation               1.231 1.085 1.216 2.847 2.839 2.826 2.805 2.787 2.774 2.753 2.729 2.707 2.692 2.671 2.656
Euro                               
- Observations                828 1599 832 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875 3875
-Mean               3.246 3.467 3.239 5.958 5.972 5.984 5.984 5.988 5.990 5.988 5. 987 5.987 5.994 6.004 6.011
-St. deviation               0.958 0.881 0.922 2.862 2.865 2.870 2.863 2.862 2. 860 2.849 2.837 2.826 2.820 2.815 2.810
Japanese Yen                               
- Observations                822 1579 822 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855 3855
-Mean               0.071 0.177 0.074 2.238 2.242 2.241 2.240 2.239 2.241 2.244 2.248 2.253 2.259 2.265 2.272
-St. deviation               0.111 0.283 0.097 2.668 2.666 2.658 2.645 2.636 2.630 2.621 2.612 2.604 2.601 2.595 2.594
Canadian Dollar                               
- Observations                804 1579 822 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477 3477
-Mean               3.190 4.105 3.179 5.257 5.291 5.322 5.355 5.387 5.417 5.453 5.487 5.535 5.561 5.595 5.631
-St. deviation               0.973 1.218 0.941 2.304 2.284 2.264 2.243 2.228 2.215 2.202 2.193 2.178 2.178 2.165 2.157
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  Maturities 
Currencies 
One 
day 
One 
week 
Two 
weeks 
1   
month 
2 
months 
3 
months 
4 
months 
5 
months 
6 
months 
7 
months 
8 
months 
9 
months 
10 
months 
11 
months 
12 
months 
German Mark                               
- Observations                 253 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037 3037
-Mean                 3.478 5.789 5.817 5.843 5.858 5.872 5.882 5.884 5.886 5.892 5.902 5.914 5.925
-St. deviation                 0.120 2.298 2.309 2.315 2.308 2.305 2.303 2.290 2.278 2.266 2.258 2.248 2.241
French Franc                               
- Observations                 253 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529 2529
-Mean                 3.458 7.139 7.150 7.164 7.150 7.137 7.127 7.116 7.107 7.102 7.102 7.106 7.107
-St. deviation                 0.080 2.849 2.824 2.809 2.776 2.748 2.727 2.707 2.689 2.676 2.666 2.656 2.648
Spanish Peseta                               
- Observations                 253 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151
-Mean                 4.407 9.570 9.512 9.467 9.432 9.406 9.380 9.374 9.373 9.369 9.373 9.380 9.386
-St. deviation                 0.464 3.667 3.589 3.530 3.500 3.486 3.472 3.460 3.459 3.458 3.457 3.462 3.464
Italian Lira                               
- Observations                 252 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151 2151
-Mean                 5.227 9.609 9.565 9.537 9.487 9.516 9.505 9.498 9.491 9.494 9.482 9.484 9.485
-St. deviation                 0.821 2.919 2.814 2.774 2.871 2.805 2.822 2.841 2.861 2.871 2.895 2.910 2.924
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for LIBOR of 11 currencies utilized in the analysis, which include the number of observations, means, 
and standard deviations for each of available maturities.  
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Figure 1. LIBOR yield curves for USD and GBP (January 1987 through March 2004) for 
maturities of one through twelve months. 
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Figure 2. LIBOR yield curves for AUD, SF, Euro, JPY (January 1989 through March 
2004), and CAD (July 1990 through March 2004) for maturities of one through twelve 
months. 
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Figure 3. LIBOR yield curves for the Euro-in zone currencies: DM (January 1987 through 
December 1998), FF (January 1989 through December 1998), SP and ITL (July 1990 
through December 1998) for maturities of one through twelve months. 
 
Figures 4 through 6 plot volatility term structures for the same sets of currencies. 
Volatility curves for maturities from one through twelve months are downward sloping for 
GBP, SF, JPY, FF, CAD, and SP. For the first five of these currencies, standard deviations 
decrease monotonically as maturity increases. This is consistent with the observation of 
Fisher (1896) that shorter-term interest rates should fluctuate more than longer-term rates. 
The volatility curves for Euro and DM are upward sloping at the short end, but soon become 
downward sloping, while that for USD also has an upward slope at the short end but becomes 
virtually flat for longer maturities. In the case of ITL, the two highest standard deviations are 
at the opposite ends of the maturity specter: its volatility curve sags in the middle. 
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Figure 4. Volatility term structures for USD and GBP LIBOR maturities  
of one through twelve months (January 1987 through March 2004). 
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Figure 5. Volatility term structures for AUD, SF, Euro, JPY (January 1989 through 
March 2004), and CAD (July 1990 through March 2004) for maturities of one through 
twelve months. 
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Figure 6. Volatility term structures for the Euro-in zone currencies:  
DM (January 1987 through December 1998), FF (January 1989 through December 
1998), SP and ITL (July 1990 through December 1998) for maturities of one through 
twelve months. 
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1.2.2 Methods 
Jordan and Jordan (1991) compare equity and fixed-income securities seasonals using 
daily returns of bond and equity indexes. They start with the day-of-the week effect. They 
classify the first 10 trading days of each month as days 1, 2, 3, …, 10, and the last 10 trading 
days as -10, -9, …, -1. Each month thus has 20 trading days (days in excess of 20 were 
deleted, and in months with fewer than 20 trading days some days were counted twice). 
Trading days 1 through 5 constitute week 1, days 6 through 10 constitute week 2, days -10 to 
-6 are week 3, and days -5 to -1 are week 4. They test for the week-of-the-month effect in 
bonds and find some significant results. Finally, they test for the turn-of-the-month and turn-
of-the-year. The turn of the month is defined as the first four trading days in each month plus 
the last trading day in the previous month. Jordan and Jordan use ANOVA to test whether 
returns are different across days, weeks, or months. They found that the January mean return 
on bonds is significantly higher than returns in other months. Half of the January mean return 
is attributable to non-turn-of-the-year days in January (they exclude turn-of-the-month days 
from the analysis to compare non-turn-of-the-month returns).  
Musto (1997) compares the spreads between commercial paper of different maturities 
before and after one of them spans the end of the year. That way, he does not need a control 
for the general level of interest rates. He finds significant differences, but misses the exact 
timing of the year-end effect. He also conducts turn-of-the-quarter tests and finds some 
significance.  
Griffiths and Winters (1997) focus on the year-end effect. They exclude all observations 
between January and November inclusive because they find no significant effects in those 
months, then run a regression with the dependent variable defined as a natural log of the 
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relative change in the spread between the repo rate and the three-month T-bill yield. The 
three-month T-bill yield was chosen because it exhibited no significant turn-of-the-year 
effect.  
Griffiths and Winters (2004) create a turn-of-the-month dummy variable that covers 
trading days –2 through 4 in each month. For the turn of the year, this variable is split into 
two (the last two trading days of the year are covered by the dummy called YEND, the first 
four – by YBEG). Since they focus on a one-month commercial paper (CP), they also create 
two dummies for the turn of November (NOVEND – the last two days of November, and 
DECBEG – the first two days of December). They use the first difference of the CP rate as a 
DV and a change in the three-month T-bill rate as a control.  
While Griffiths and Winters (2004) concentrate on the turn of the year, this study also 
focuses on “regular” quarter-ends. It is recognized that year-ends might be different from 
other quarter-ends. For example, Musto (1997) finds that the year-end effect in U.S. 
commercial paper is much larger in magnitude than yield changes related to other quarter-
ends. Thus, two sets of dummy variables were created to make the distinction between year-
ends and other quarter-ends. The following model is specified and estimated using OLS with 
White’s (1980) adjustment for heteroskedasticity: 
∆Rspt = α0 + α1(∆Rspt-1)+ α2BQCR + α3AQCR + α4BQEND + α5AQEND + 
α6BYCR + α7AYCR + α8BYEND + α9AYEND + εt    (1) 
where: 
∆Rspt  = the change in the relative spread between LIBOR of given currency and 
maturity and the three-month LIBOR for the same currency, Rspt – Rspt-1. 
The relative spread is defined as Rt/3MRt, where Rt is the short-term 
LIBOR whose behavior is studied, and 3MRt is the three-month LIBOR 
for the same currency, which serves as the base rate. 
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∆Rspt-1  = the previous day change in the LIBOR of given currency and maturity, 
Rspt-1 – Rspt-2
 
BQCR  = a dummy variable that equals 1 on the two trading days before the 
maturity of the instrument starts to span the end of the quarter, except the 
fourth quarter, and 0 otherwise, 
 
AQCR = a dummy variable that equals 1 on the two trading days after the 
maturity of the instrument starts to span the end of the quarter, excluding 
the fourth quarter, and 0 otherwise, 
 
BQEND = a dummy variable that equals 1 on the last two trading days of the 
quarter, excluding the fourth quarter, and 0 otherwise, 
 
AQEND  = a dummy variable that equals 1 on the first two trading days of the 
quarter, excluding the fourth quarter. 
 
BYCR, AYCR, BYEND, and AYEND are the dummy variables defined similarly to the 
previous four dummies; they are designed to isolate the turn of the fourth quarter. We 
will be referring to the ends of quarters one, two, and three as quarter-ends, and to the end 
of the forth quarter as the year-end hereafter.  
For the sake of clarity, an example with actual dates would help visualize the timing of 
the turn of the quarter and the correspondence of particular days to the dummy variables. 
Table 3 below provides such an example under assumptions of the turn of the first quarter 
and LIBOR maturity of one week (seven calendar days). For ends of quarters one through 
three, there are always five trading days between the “issuance” of the one-week LIBOR and 
its maturity. At the turn of the year, however, only three trading days are spanned by the 
maturity of the instrument; this is because Christmas (December 25th) and Boxing Day 
(December 26th) are non-trading days in the U.K. It creates a situation where the two dummy 
variables, AQCR and BYEND, overlap in some years. This presents a methodological 
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problem and makes year-end results for the one-week LIBOR less reliable. This is not a 
problem for longer maturities, of course. 
Table 3 also contains signs of the coefficients of the turn-of-the quarter dummies 
associated with each of the three competing hypotheses summarized in the literature review. 
This is done to help the reader visualize the dynamics of yield changes that would be 
consistent with each of the hypotheses. 
Table 3. The turn-of-the-quarter dummy variables and their hypothesized signs 
Hypothesized yield change signs    
Variable/ 
Date BQCR AQCR BQEND AQEND 
Flight from 
risk WD 
Idle cash 
WD 
Preferred 
habitat 
3/23, Mon 1 0 0 0 ? ? + 
3/24, Tue 1 0 0 0 ? ? + 
3/25, Wed 0 1 0 0 + – ? 
3/26, Thu 0 1 0 0 + – ? 
3/27, Fri 0 0 0 0 ? ? ? 
3/28, Sat 0 0 0 0 ? ? ? 
3/29, Sun 0 0 0 0 ? ? ? 
3/30, Mon 0 0 1 0 ? ? – 
3/31, Tue 0 0 1 0 ? ? – 
4/1, Wed 0 0 0 1 – + ? 
4/2, Thu 0 0 0 1 – + ? 
Table 3 illustrates the timing of the dummy variables designed to test for the turn-of-the quarter 
effect and short-term yield changes consistent with each of the competing hypotheses. It has been 
developed for a hypothetical first quarter and one-week maturity. 
 
The change in the relative spread was selected as a dependent variable. The measure of 
the relative spread was defined as Rt/3MRt, where 3MRt is the three-month LIBOR for a 
given currency.7 The independent variables include the lagged change in the relative spread 
along with the turn-of-the-quarter and turn-of-the year dummies. The three-month LIBOR 
was chosen to be the base rate, or the control for the general level of interest rates for a given 
currency. Its choice was stipulated by the finding that the three-month LIBOR is the shortest 
                                                 
7 Defining the relative spread as (Rt –3MRt)/3MRt does not make any difference because daily changes in 
these differently defined spreads are identical: ∆[(Rt –3MRt)/3MRt ] = ∆[Rt /3MRt] 
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maturity that does not have quarter-end or year-end preferred habitats. It also reduces as 
much as possible the maturity mismatch between the rate being studied and the base rate. 
Another possible choice for the dependent variable is a daily change in the interest rate, 
or simple first difference. This choice provides a very straightforward interpretation of the 
results: the coefficients of independent variables are basis points. However, one general 
concern that may be raised about this dependent variable is that it does not capture trends in 
rates or spreads. To address this concern, the change in the relative spread was selected as a 
dependent variable.8  
One more remark is in order before proceeding to the results section. All studies cited 
above have dealt with private-issue U.S. securities such as commercial paper, repurchase 
agreements, bankers’ acceptances, etc. The interbank (fed funds) market was avoided 
because it has well-documented regularities (see, for example, Cyree and Winters (2001)) 
that may make the analysis more difficult. While the data utilized in this study represent 
interbank loan rates, there is no reason to suspect that regularities similar to those in the U.S. 
federal funds market also exist in the London interbank market. Interbank rates may reflect 
the needs of bank customers, e.g., large fund withdrawals before a year-end may lead to 
higher interbank rates. Moreover, banks themselves may have quarter-end or year-end cash 
obligations such as interest payments on long-term debt and dividend payments to 
shareholders. If this is the case, we might see significant quarter-end and year-end effects 
consistent with the preferred habitat hypothesis.  
                                                 
8 Results are not qualitatively different if a simple first difference (Rspt – Rspt-1.), an absolute spread (Rspt – 
3MRt-1.), or a change in absolute spread is used as a dependent variable. 
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On the other hand, if banks are involved in idle-cash window dressing, the interbank rate 
is expected to decline before and rebound after disclosure dates as banks attempt to show less 
cash on books to appear more efficient. The flight-from-risk variant of window dressing 
would be feasible only if banks believe that interbank loans are perceived as risky by 
investors who read quarter-end and year-end disclosures. The use of LIBOR data provides a 
good opportunity for testing for quarter-end and year-end effects.  
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1.3 Empirical Results 
 
1.3.1 One-week Results 
Before proceeding to the discussion of regression output, a reader may find it useful to 
visualize the dynamics of quarter- and year-end behavior of short-term rates. These are 
graphically presented for one-week LIBOR of each of the seven currencies in Figures 7 
through 20. The figures plot the average (absolute, not relative) spread for the period from 
January 1998 through March 2004 between the one-week and three-month LIBOR for each 
currency around quarter-ends. That is, the spread in basis points on trading day -10 relative to 
the end of the quarter has been averaged across all quarters for which both one-week and 
three-month rates are available. The same has been done to the spreads on trading days -9 
through 10 relative to the quarter-end. Each quarter ends with day -1 and begins with day 1, 
that is, there is no day 0.  
A pair of graphs describes turn-of-the-quarter and turn-of-the-year spread behavior for 
each currency starting with the U.S. Dollar. The first graph plots the following three series: 
1) spreads around all quarter-ends and year-ends, 2) spreads around all quarter-ends and 
year-ends with the exception of Y2K, and 3) spreads around quarter-ends only. The second 
graph plots two average spread series that depict the spread behavior around year-ends only, 
one with and the other one without the observations around Y2K.  
The patterns of spread changes presented in Figures 7 through 20 is consistent (in both 
timing and direction) with the quarter-end and year-end preferred habitat for liquidity in all 
seven currencies. These patterns are particularly pronounced in the U.S. Dollar, Swiss Franc, 
Euro, and Japanese Yen. For all seven currencies, the spread between one-week and three-
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month LIBOR increases on days -7 through -5 relative to the quarter- or year-end, and 
returns to normal levels on the second to last trading day of the quarter or year. Regression 
analysis should provide a more definite conclusion regarding the statistical significance of 
these calendar effects.  
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USD one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1/98 - 3/04
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Figure 7. Average spread in basis points around quarter-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for USD over the period January 1998 through March 2004. 
 
 
USD one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1998-2004
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Figure 8. Average spread in basis points around year-ends between the one-week and three-
month LIBOR for USD for year-ends 1998 through 2004. 
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GBP one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1/98 - 3/04
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Figure 9. Average spread in basis points around quarter-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for GBP over the period January 1998 through March 2004. 
 
GBP one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1998 - 2004
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trading days relative to year-end
Sp
re
ad
s 
in
 b
p
Year-ends Year-ends without Y2K
 
Figure 10. Average spread in basis points around year-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for GBP for year-ends 1998 through 2004. 
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AUD one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1/98 - 3/04
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trading days relative to quarter-end
Sp
re
ad
 in
 b
p
Q- and Y-ends Q- and Y-ends, no Y2k Q-ends only
 
Figure 11. Average spread in basis points around quarter-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for AUD over the period January 1998 through March 2004. 
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Figure 12. Average spread in basis points around year-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for AUD for year-ends 1998 through 2004. 
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SF one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1/98 - 3/04
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Figure 13. Average spread in basis points around quarter-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for SF over the period January 1998 through March 2004. 
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Figure 14. Average spread in basis points around year-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for SF for year-ends 1998 through 2004. 
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Euro one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1/98 - 3/04
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Figure 15. Average spread in basis points around quarter-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for Euro over the period January 1998 through March 2004. 
 
 
Euro one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1998 - 2004
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Trading days relative to year-end
Sp
re
ad
 in
 b
p
Year-ends Year-ends without Y2K
 
Figure 16. Average spread in basis points around year-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for Euro for year-ends 1998 through 2004. 
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JPY one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1/98 - 3/04
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Figure 17. Average spread in basis points around quarter-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for JPY over the period January 1998 through March 2004. 
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Figure 18. Average spread in basis points around year-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for JPY for year-ends 1998 through 2004. 
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CAD one-week - 3-month LIBOR spread, 1/98 - 3/04
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Figure 19. Average spread in basis points around quarter-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for CAD over the period January 1998 through March 2004. 
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Figure 20. Average spread in basis points around year-ends between the one-week and 
three-month LIBOR for CAD for year-ends 1998 through 2004. 
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The patterns of spread changes for all seven currencies are consistent with the preferred 
habitat hypothesis; they are similar to that graphed for one-week repo spread in Figure 1 in 
Griffiths and Winters (1997).  
Table 4 presents the output for regressions with the change in one-week LIBOR as a 
dependent variable. Again, the seven currencies for which the analysis was conducted are 
USD, GBP, AUD, Euro, SF, JPY, and CAD. Although one year of one-week LIBOR fixings 
is available for the Euro-in zone currencies, these data were not included in the analysis due 
to the small number of quarter-ends.  
In Tables 4 and 5, statistically significant coefficients (at the 5% level or better) are in 
bold, and marginally significant coefficients (between the 5% and 10% level) are bold and 
italicized. Panel A of Table 4 contains the output from the model estimation over the entire 
data availability period, January 1998 through March 2004, without controlling for the Y2K. 
Panel B shows the results for the same time period with controls for the Y2K. We control for 
Y2K as a unique event in the sense that demand for liquidity was highest around it, which 
might have prompted the one-week rates to skyrocket in December 1999. A closer look at the 
one-week series supports this conjecture for six out of seven currencies. For example, one-
week JPY LIBOR was 0.0825% on December 21, 1.875% on December 22, 5.25% on 
December 23, and 6.0625% on December 24, 1999. It fell to 0.1275% on December 29, the 
next business day. All other currencies with the exception of GBP also exhibited large, 
although not as striking, jumps in one-week LIBOR on these dates.  
To isolate the effect of the Y2K, a separate set of turn-of-the-year dummy variables 
similar to those in equation (1) has been created. The coefficients of those dummies are not 
reported in the table not to stray the reader’s attention off of “regular” year-ends.  
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Overall, the output supports preferred habitat for liquidity around quarter-ends. In the 
discussion of the results, we will focus more on the output presented in Panel B. The results 
are consistent with preferred habitat for the major world currencies: USD, Euro, SF, and JPY. 
For example, the coefficient of BQCR for USD (Panel B of Table 4) is 0.013. This means 
that the average change in the relative spread between one-week and three-month USD 
LIBOR is 0.013 higher on the two trading days preceding the day on which one-week 
LIBOR begins to mature in the next quarter than on “regular” days. If we assume that the 
three-month USD LIBOR stays unchanged at 3.930% (the mean of the three-month USD 
LIBOR over the period of analysis), the coefficient value of 0.013 would translate into a 5.1 
basis points increase in the one-week rate on each of these two days.9 The USD relative 
spread change is 0.018 lower on the last two days of the quarter than on other days; under the 
same assumptions, it is an equivalent of a 7.1 basis points decline in the one-week rate on 
each of these two days. Both coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The patterns of turn-
of-the-quarter one-week – three-month LIBOR spread changes for Euro, SF, and JPY are 
similar. The daily basis point equivalent changes (again, assuming the average level of the 
three-month LIBOR) in one-week rates on each of the days corresponding respectively to 
BQCR and BQEND are: 3.5 and -3.9 basis points for Euro, 5.3 and -4.3  basis points for JPY, 
and 10.9 and -10.3 basis points in the case of SF. This pattern of spread changes is consistent 
with preferred habitat for liquidity and is not consistent with either variant of window 
dressing (see Table 3 on p.31). This result does not necessarily deny window dressing but it 
at least suggests that quarter-end preference for liquidity has more influence on the behavior 
of short-term interest rates for major world currencies around quarter-ends and year-ends.  
                                                 
9 After solving for ∆Rt in ∆Rt/3.930 = 0.013. 
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The British Pound and Canadian Dollar do not exhibit statistically significant evidence of 
quarter-end preferred habitat, although the signs of the coefficients are consistent with 
preferred habitat. In the case of the Australian Dollar, the decrease in the spread occurs 
before the quarter-end, while the increase is not fully captured by the dummy variables. A 
plot of AUD spread changes around quarter-ends in Figure 11 suggests that the increase in 
the spread may be too gradual to be captured by the dummy variables. 
Turn-of-the year dummy variables’ coefficients are much larger in magnitude than their 
turn-of-the quarter counterparts. This is not surprising since the highest need for liquidity 
normally arises before year-ends (see Ogden (1987)). Given a small number of observations 
(five year-ends after controlling for Y2K), the results are still statistically significant at the 
5% level for the three currencies: USD, Euro, and SF. Although the year-end results in JPY 
and CAD are only marginally significant, the interest rate changes are large in magnitude and 
may be considered economically significant: Stigum (1990) notes that money market traders 
consider 10 to 20 basis points as an attractive arbitrage opportunity. The Pound Sterling 
shows a large significant decline in the spread prior to the year-end, while the preceding 
increase in the spread is comparable in magnitude to that decrease but is not statistically 
significant. It might be too gradual to be captured by the dummies. The Australian Dollar 
exhibits some statistically significant spread changes around the end of the year, but these 
changes are not consistent with any of the hypotheses. 
The basis point equivalents of the relative spread changes prior to the year-end (again, 
under the assumption that the three-month LIBOR is at its average level and stays 
unchanged) are: for USD – an increase of 40 basis points (bp) on each of the two days 
covered by the BYCR dummy, followed by a 24-basis point decrease on each day covered by 
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the BYEND dummy; for Euro – a 14 bp increase and -12.3 bp decrease, for JPY –a 6.8 bp 
jump and a 7.2 bp fall, and for SF – a 47 bp spike and a 32 bp decrease, respectively. Overall, 
the fact that the participants in the London interbank market do not arbitrage away such 
profitable opportunities suggests that something is going on in the money market that 
prevents them from doing so. In the context of this study, the most likely explanation for this 
empirical phenomenon is that the high demand for liquidity around year-ends is not matched 
by the equally high supply, which drives up yields of short-term securities that mature in the 
new year.  
Table 4. One-week LIBOR regressions results. 
Panel A. Estimation output without controlling for Y2K  
   USD GBP AUD     EURO SF JPY CAD
Variable    Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept    <0.001 0.743 <0.001 0.837 <0.001 0.575 <0.001 0.588 0.001 0.530 0.007 0.133 <0.001 0.765
LagDV –0.196 0.035 –0.171 0.000 –0.050 0.281 –0.204 0.002 –0.248 0.002 0.022 0.897 –0.058 0.463 
BQCR 0.012  0.003 –0.002 0.740 0.001 0.309 0.008 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.122 0.099 0.002 0.397 
AQCR  0.002 0.147 0.008 0.238 0.001 0.279 0.002 0.062 –0.012 0.006 –0.046 0.204 0.003 0.008 
BQEND –0.018 0.000 0.001 0.910 –0.004 0.011 –0.010 0.003 –0.057 0.000 –0.111 0.001 –0.005 0.014 
AQEND  –0.002 0.093 0.000 0.934 -0.001 0.416 -0.001 0.340 –0.006 0.182 –0.023 0.004 0.001 0.214 
BYCR 0.117   0.006 0.005 0.793 0.008 0.340 0.060 0.018 0.357 0.022 0.548 0.117 0.024 0.194 
AYCR –0.041 0.056 0.037 0.146 –0.008 0.081 –0.036 0.059 –0.183 0.035 –0.649 0.264 –0.005 0.575 
BYEND –0.065 0.014 –0.056 0.006 0.000 0.971 –0.037 0.029 –0.219 0.032 –0.611 0.303 –0.015 0.068 
AYEND   –0.010 0.024 0.011 0.654 –0.007 0.010 –0.001 0.586 0.010 0.346 0.009 0.787 0.000 0.859
F-statistic 72.0  7.9    3.6  44.0  63.1 22.5 11.3  
Adj. R2 0.288          0.038 0.03 0.197 0.262 0.109 0.056
                       
Panel B. Y2K controls included  
                       
Intercept    <0.001 0.823 <0.001 0.824 <0.001 0.595 <0.001 0.735 <0.001 0.750 0.004 0.314 <0.001 0.856
LagDV –0.240  0.014 –0.187 0.000 –0.119 0.052 –0.349 0.001 –0.364 0.000 -0.766 0.000 –0.225 0.073 
BQCR 0.013   0.002 –0.002 0.725 0.001 0.274 0.010 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.238 0.003 0.002 0.262 
AQCR   0.002 0.126 0.008 0.227 0.001 0.251 0.002 0.040 –0.012 0.001 –0.059 0.276 0.003 0.008 
BQEND –0.018 0.000 0.001 0.906 –0.004 0.009 –0.011 0.001 –0.061 0.000 –0.192 0.000 –0.005 0.009 
AQEND   –0.002 0.089 –0.001 0.929 -0.001 0.333 -0.001 0.384 –0.006 0.225 –0.030 0.001 0.001 0.357 
BYCR 0.102   0.012 0.017 0.439 -0.001 0.631 0.040 0.000 0.278 0.040 0.303 0.081 0.010 0.024 
AYCR     –0.032 0.140 0.041 0.117 –0.005 0.032 –0.023 0.156 –0.115 0.135 –0.066 0.765 0.004 0.480
BYEND –0.061  0.020 –0.053 0.009 0.004 0.037 –0.035 0.007 –0.190 0.029 –0.325 0.103 –0.007 0.076 
AYEND –0.005 0.038 –0.009 0.698 –0.006 0.006 0.001 0.526 0.026 0.000 0.010 0.776 0.003 0.125 
F-statistic 63.9   8.5  16.1   66.2  84.4   207.2   31.3  
Adj. R2 0.324   0.054  0.102   0.332  0.388   0.611   0.188  
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Turn-of-the-quarter and turn-of-the-year effect in LIBOR for major world currencies in the one-week maturity. The parameters are estimated 
using Equation (1): 
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∆Rspt = α0 + α1(∆Rspt-1)+ α2BQCR + α3AQCR + α4BQEND + α5AQEND + α6BQCR + α7AQCR + α8BQEND + α9AQEND + εt  
 
The dependent variable is the daily change in the relative spread between the one-week and three-month LIBOR for a given currency; the 
dummy variables BQCR, AQCR, BQEND, and AQEND are designed to capture changes in the relative spread on days surrounding ends of 
quarters one, two, and three, while the dummy variables BYCR, AYCR, BYEND, and AYEND perform the same function around year-ends.   
 
 
1.3.2 One-month Results 
Figures 21 and 22 present the dynamics of the spread between the one-month and three-
month USD LIBOR around quarter-ends and year-ends over the period of the analysis (1/87 
through 3/04). It is clear that the spread increases on the days before the maturity of one-
month LIBOR starts to span the end of the quarter; this increase is sustained until the second 
to last trading day of the quarter. Figure 21 is very similar to Figure 2 in Griffiths and 
Winters (2004). 
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Figure 21. Average spreads between the one-month and three-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR 
around quarter- and year-ends, over the period January 1987 through March 2004. 
 
It is quite evident from Figure 21 that the year-end effect in one-month USD LIBOR is 
much larger in magnitude than the quarter-end effect. Figure 22 isolates year-ends from 
quarter-ends. Along with Figure 21, it emphasizes the magnitude of the turn-of-the year 
effect which by far exceeds that of the regular turn-of-the-quarter effect in one-month USD 
LIBOR. It also demonstrates that the turn of the Year 2000 was not a major factor 
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contributing into the dynamics of the spread behavior around year-ends. This is opposite of 
what we have observed for one-week LIBOR. The minimal Y2K influence on this data series 
may be due to the longer maturity of the instrument reflecting the lack of urgency to borrow 
before Y2K. Also, one-month spreads have been averaged over 17 years of data available for 
this maturity. Any particular observation has to truly stand out to significantly affect the 
average. This is apparently not the case with Y2K for one-month USD LIBOR; it is also true 
for the other six currencies with the data available around Y2K. Therefore, only one graph is 
reported for each of the other six currencies. It contains two series: one depicting spread 
changes around “regular” quarter-ends and the other plotting spreads around year-ends. Year-
end effects are much larger in magnitude than quarter-end effects.  
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Figure 22. Average spreads between the one-month and three-month U.S. Dollar LIBOR 
around year-ends. 
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GBP one-month - three-month LIBOR spread, 1/87 - 3/04
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Figure 23. Average spreads between the one-month and three-month Pound Sterling 
LIBOR around quarter- and year-ends, over the period January 1987 through March 2004. 
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Figure 24. Average spreads between one-month and three-month Australian Dollar LIBOR 
around quarter- and year-ends, over the period January 1989 through March 2004. 
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SF one-month - three-months LIBOR spread, 1/89 - 3/04
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Figure 25. Average spreads between the one-month and three-month Swiss Frank LIBOR 
around quarter- and year-ends, over the period January 1989 through March 2004. 
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Figure 26. Average spreads between the one-month and three-month Euro LIBOR around 
quarter- and year-ends, over the period January 1989 through March 2004. 
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JPY one-month - three-months LIBOR spread, 1/89 - 3/04
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Figure 27. Average spreads between the one-month and three-month JPY LIBOR around 
quarter- and year-ends, over the period January 1989 through March 2004. 
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Figure 28. Average spreads between the one-month and three-month Canadian Dollar 
LIBOR around quarter- and year-ends, over the period July 1990 through March 2004. 
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Figures 21 through 28 demonstrate that the year-end increase in spreads exists in all 
seven currencies. While these increases start on day -22 or -23 relative to the year-end (which 
typically correspond to the BYCR dummy) in all currencies, the subsequent decrease is less 
uniform across the currencies, although it always starts prior to the calendar year-end. For 
example, in the case of the Canadian Dollar, a sharp decrease occurs on day -9, while for the 
Pound Sterling and the Australian Dollar the decline starts on day -5. For the rest of the 
currencies, the larger spreads are sustained through the third-to-last or second-to-last day of 
the year.10  
Table 5 contains the regression output for one-month LIBOR for all 11 currencies 
included in the analysis. Panels A and B have been constructed similarly to those in Table 4: 
they present the results for the same seven currencies with and without the dummies 
controlling for Y2K. Panel C contains the regression output for the four Euro-in zone 
currencies. LIBOR fixings for these currencies were ceased at the end of 1998, which renders 
the Y2K problem irrelevant for them.  
The output presented in Table 5 provides support for preferred habitat at both quarter-
ends and year-ends. The magnitude of the year-end effect differs across currencies: the 
increase and the subsequent decrease are higher in USD, Euro, JPY, and SF than in other 
currencies, although in the case of the Euro the decrease is rather gradual. The turn-of-the-
year effect consistent with preferred habitat for liquidity is statistically significant but small 
in GBP. In the case of CAD, the decrease may not have been captured by the dummy 
variables: as evident from Figure 28, a drop in the spread occurs in CAD prior to the days 
covered by the dummy BYEND. Among the currencies replaced by the Euro, DM and ITL 
                                                 
10 The two-day spike in the spread for JPY on day -4 is due to Y2K; this is its only noticeable influence for 
the one-month LIBOR across all currencies. 
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exhibit the pattern of one-month interest rate changes consistent with the turn-of-the-year 
preferred habitat for liquidity. None of the currencies exhibit behavior consistent with either 
idle cash or flight-from-risk window dressing.  
One easily noticeable feature of the output reported in Table 5 is that the magnitude of 
the quarter-end effect in the one-month LIBOR is much smaller than in the one-week 
LIBOR, while the year-end effect is large and statistically significant in both one-week and 
one-month maturities. In the one-month maturity, only JPY demonstrates a turn-of-the 
quarter effect that is both economically and statistically significant. The turn-of-the-quarter 
coefficients for USD are statistically significant but small. For Euro and SF, the turn-of-the 
quarter coefficients lack statistical significance. These differences in quarter-end results 
between one-week and one-month maturities suggest that banks and their customers start 
preparing for the end of the year well in advance (and this is reflected in the turn-of-the-year 
effect in the one-month interest rate), while the preparation to meet quarter-end obligations 
starts relatively close to the calendar quarter-end. Therefore, we observe a strong turn-of-the-
year effect in both one-week and one-month LIBOR, but a strong turn-of-the-quarter effect 
only in the one-week maturity. 
The results reported here are in line with the findings of Griffiths and Winters (2004), 
although the methods are different. This may imply robustness of the results to different 
methods.11 
 
11 The results do not change qualitatively when other methods are used. 
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Table 5. One-month LIBOR results. 
Panel A. Estimation output without controlling for Y2K 
   USD GBP AUD     EURO SF JPY CAD
Variable    Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
Intercept <0.001  0.060 <0.001 0.984 <0.001 0.953 <0.001 0.940 <0.001 0.716 <0.001 0.635 <0.001 0.626 
LagDV -0.293 0.000 -0.126 0.008 -0.147 0.000 -0.173 0.006 -0.270 0.007 -0.033 0.640 -0.124 0.028 
BQCR 0.004   0.000 0.000 0.563 0.001 0.042 0.000 0.955 0.000 0.963 0.042 0.000 0.001 0.131 
AQCR   0.000 0.678 0.000 0.634 0.000 0.805 -0.001 0.056 -0.001 0.314 0.000 0.869 -0.001 0.177 
BQEND -0.006   0.000 -0.001 0.222 -0.001 0.048 -0.003 0.046 -0.015 0.000 -0.032 0.000 -0.001 0.624 
AQEND 0.001   0.011 -0.001 0.283 0.000 0.992 -0.001 0.291 0.001 0.522 0.004 0.063 0.001 0.238 
BYCR 0.048   0.000 0.002 0.029 0.004 0.089 0.016 0.000 0.072 0.000 0.102 0.097 0.010 0.057 
AYCR    -0.001 0.268 0.003 0.210 0.001 0.639 0.001 0.387 -0.003 0.168 0.001 0.834 0.001 0.601
BYEND -0.022  0.000 -0.004 0.024 -0.001 0.604 -0.003 0.266 -0.037 0.000 -0.101 0.117 -0.002 0.381 
AYEND -0.002    0.060 0.002 0.154 -0.002 0.012 0.000 0.961 -0.002 0.451 0.002 0.727 0.001 0.501
F-statistic 157.0  10.2  12.7  29.5  76.7  27.6  9.3  
Adj. R2 0.244        0.019 0.027 0.062 0.150 0.058 0.021
                       
Panel B. Y2K controls are included 
                       
Intercept <0.001   0.057 <0.001 0.987 <0.001 0.942 <0.001 0.928 <0.001 0.696 <0.001 0.705 <0.001 0.619 
LagDV -0.309   0.000 -0.138 0.004 -0.177 0.000 -0.201 0.000 -0.353 0.001 -0.494 0.000 -0.160 0.011
BQCR 0.004   0.000 <0.001 0.568 0.001 0.041 <0.001 0.947 <0.001 0.947 0.057 0.000 0.001 0.137 
AQCR   <0.001 0.699 <0.001 0.650 <0.001 0.811 -0.001 0.053 -0.001 0.294 0.004 0.189 -0.001 0.191 
BQEND -0.007   0.000 -0.001 0.219 -0.001 0.041 -0.003 0.039 -0.015 0.000 -0.047 0.000 -0.001 0.599 
AQEND 0.001   0.011 -0.001 0.278 <0.001 0.988 -0.001 0.293 0.001 0.548 0.006 0.011 0.001 0.227 
BYCR 0.046    0.000 0.002 0.016 0.002 0.081 0.012 0.000 0.059 0.000 0.070 0.019 0.005 0.006
AYCR    -0.001 0.295 0.001 0.521 0.001 0.533 0.002 0.412 -0.004 0.153 -0.000 0.914 0.003 0.106
BYEND -0.020   0.000 -0.004 0.042 0.001 0.518 -0.005 0.018 -0.031 0.000 -0.053 0.004 -0.001 0.628 
AYEND    -0.001 0.128 0.001 0.428 -0.002 0.025 <0.001 0.741 -0.000 0.861 0.003 0.659 0.002 0.041 
F-statistic 119.6   11.4   21.0   42.3   99.4   242.1   17.9   
Adj. R2 0.261   0.030  0.063   0.122  0.249   0.449   0.060   
 
 
 
Panel C. Euro-in zone currencies 
 DM FF SP ITL 
Variable Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept <0.001 0.207 <0.001 0.911 <0.001 0.927 <0.001 0.900 
LagDV -0.352 0.000 -0.244 0.052 -0.363 0.128 -0.127 0.365 
BQCR 0.002 0.001 <0.001 0.678 0.001 0.698 <0.001 0.894 
AQCR <0.001 0.643 -0.001 0.168 -0.002 0.178 0.001 0.278 
BQEND -0.002 0.230 0.001 0.699 0.000 0.857 -0.001 0.414 
AQEND -0.001 0.367 -0.002 0.444 -0.001 0.333 0.001 0.568 
BYCR 0.030 0.000 0.002 0.303 0.002 0.260 0.011 0.011 
AYCR -0.001 0.554 0.005 0.037 0.001 0.385 0.001 0.457 
BYEND -0.009 0.000 -0.001 0.506 -0.002 0.078 -0.009 0.013 
AYEND -0.001 0.251 0.004 0.265 0.001 0.383 <0.001 0.836 
F-statistic 76.7   18.6   36.3   6.0   
Adj. R-squared 0.183   0.059   0.129   0.020  
Turn-of-the-quarter and turn-of-the-year effect in LIBOR for major world currencies in the one-
month maturity. The parameters are estimated using Equation (1): 
 
∆Rspt = α0 + α1(∆Rspt-1)+ α2BQCR + α3AQCR + α4BQEND + α5AQEND + α6BQCR + α7AQCR 
+ α8BQEND + α9AQEND + εt  
 
The dependent variable is the daily change in the relative spread between the one-month and 
three-month LIBOR for a given currency; the dummy variables BQCR, AQCR, BQEND, and 
AQEND are designed to capture changes in the relative spread on days surrounding ends of 
quarters one, two, and three, while the dummy variables BYCR, AYCR, BYEND, and AYEND 
perform the same function around year-ends. 
 
 
The results for the two-month LIBOR are similar to those for the one-month LIBOR, 
although they are significantly less pronounced. To save space, they are not reported. The 
three-month LIBOR and longer maturities do not exhibit the turn-of-the quarter effects in any 
of the currencies. 
 
1.3.3 “Large” versus “Small” Currencies 
As is evident from the empirical results reported above, four of the major world 
currencies – USD, Euro, JPY, and SF – have larger quarter-end and year-end effects in the 
one-week maturity than the currencies serving smaller markets – GBP, CAD, and AUD. The 
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same is true about the one-month maturity, where the same four currencies (USD, Euro, JPY, 
and SF) and also DM (which played the role of the European currency before the 
introduction of the Euro) exhibit much larger year-end effects than other currencies.  The 
only “small-market” currency with the statistically significant year-end effect consistent with 
preferred habitat for liquidity is ITL.  
The year-end effects in GBP and CAD are less significant, both statistically and 
economically, than in the major four currencies (five in the case of the one-month maturity), 
but they are still noticeable; there is no doubt about the presence of the year-end effect in 
these two currencies. The currency that exhibits the least consistency with preferred habitat 
for liquidity or window dressing is AUD. Two Euro-in zone currencies, FF and SP, also have 
year-end changes in yields that are close to nonexistent. 
As noted above, currencies that exhibit statistically and economically significant quarter-
end and year-end effects tend to be “large” in terms of the market size of the countries they 
serve. The U.S., the European Union, and Japan represent three of the four world’s largest 
economies (measured by GDP), as well as the world’s three largest importers and exporters. 
Switzerland’s economy is not comparable to these three in terms of size; however, total 
assets of Swiss banks exceed those of Australia and Canada combined and rank among 
highest in the world. This may explain the presence of the quarter-end and year-end preferred 
habitat for liquidity in the Swiss Franc.  
The Pound Sterling exhibits the year-end effect lacking statistical significance. This is 
somewhat surprising in that the U.K. is one of the largest economies in the world in terms of 
GDP, export, and the bank assets. The graphical analysis of the data (Figures 9, 10, and 23) 
suggests that the regression may not detect a statistically significant effect due to the more 
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gradual changes in the spread than in other currencies: the relative spread tends to increase 
over four or five days instead of two. Also, GBP LIBOR has been noticeably more volatile 
over the study period than other interest rates (see Figures 4 through 6). High variance in the 
data makes confidence intervals wider and the null hypothesis of no quarter-end and no year-
end effects less likely to be rejected.  
The apparent division between big-market and smaller-market currencies in terms of the 
significance and magnitude of the quarter-end and year-ends preferred habitat effects 
suggests that the demand for the major world currencies – U.S. Dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen, 
Swiss Franc, and, to a lesser degree, Pound Sterling, – peaks prior to quarter-ends and 
especially year-ends. Banks’ behavior (expressed in the London Interbank Offer Rate) is 
evidently consistent with the need of bank customers to meet their quarter-end and year-and 
cash obligations (business customers) or to make large expenditures (such as year-end 
shopping for individuals). While it is not exactly clear what group of bank customers 
contributes the most to these calendar effects, large multinational corporations involved in 
export and import operations, especially in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, must be one of the 
major forces.  
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1.4 Conclusion 
The first part of this study extends the literature on calendar-time effects in the money 
markets by examining turn-of-the-quarter and turn-of-the-year effects in short-term interest 
rates for various currencies. This is done by using London Interbank Offer Rates for short-
term loans in different currencies. The quarter-end and year-end effects behavior in very 
short-term rates (one-week and one-month maturities) is consistent with the preferred habitat 
for liquidity. These quarter-end and year-end effects are particularly large and statistically 
significant in the U.S dollar and three of the other major world currencies: the Euro, the 
Japanese Yen, and the Swiss Franc. The results for the Pound Sterling and the Canadian 
Dollar are less pronounced and less significant, but still consistent with the preferred habitat 
for liquidity. Among the currencies replaced by the Euro, the German Mark and the Italian 
Lira demonstrated changes in interest rates consistent with the year-end preferred habitat for 
liquidity in the one-month maturity.  
The results suggest that the quarter-end and year-end demand for liquidity is driven by 
large multinational corporations operating with major world currencies (USD, Euro, JPY, SF, 
and, before the introduction of the Euro, DM). Behavior of short-term yields of the 
currencies that do not exhibit signs of preferred habitat (AUD, FF, and SP) is not consistent 
with the competing hypothesis, window dressing.  
Overall, the findings further emphasize the importance of investors’ preference for 
liquidity and its influence on money market yields. The evidence presented in this study does 
not refute window dressing by financial institutions; rather, it suggests that window dressing 
is not a dominating force in the money markets around quarter-ends and year-ends. 
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PART 2. TESTS OF THE EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS IN THE 
PRESENCE OF PREFERRED HABITAT FOR LIQUIDITY. 
 
2.1 Theories of the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
The term structure of interest rates, or the relations among yields of securities with 
different time to maturity, has been of major interest to economists. One of the oldest models 
in finance is the expectations hypothesis introduced by Fisher (1896). The expectations 
hypothesis (EH) relates short-term and long-term interest rates. It has been one of the most 
widely tested propositions in the economics and finance literature.  
Essentially, the EH states that future expected interest rates are implied by the current 
term structure. The pure expectations hypothesis states that one-period returns on a long-term 
bond and a short-term bond should be equal. This means that future expected interest rates 
are equal to forward rates implied by the current term structure. Alternatively, the return on 
holding a long-term bond to maturity should be equal to the expected return on investment in 
a series of short-term bonds over the life of the long-term bond.12 The pure form of EH 
requires risk-neutrality on part of investors, who must be indifferent between investing in a 
long-term bond and rolling over a sequence of short-term bonds. That is, they require no 
premium when investing in a long-term bond. 
Another theory that adds to the explanation of the term structure is the liquidity 
preference hypothesis proposed by Hicks (1946). It assumes that investors are risk averse and 
thus prefer the less risky short-term securities; they could be induced to hold longer-term, 
                                                 
12 This statement is true in the case of certainty. For uncertain interest rates, deviations between long- and 
short-bond returns should follow a zero-mean white noise process. 
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more risky, securities if offered extra yield. The difference in yields has been labeled a term 
premium. The amount that constitutes the term premium is expected to increase with 
maturity because longer-term debt securities have higher price risk (an increasing default risk 
can also be of concern if the security is not default risk-free).  
The liquidity preference theory does not contradict the EH, only its pure form. It is 
possible to test empirically whether the EH holds by allowing for the term premium in the 
relation between short and long interest rates. However, the term premium must be constant 
for a given maturity for the EH to hold.  
The market segmentation hypothesis proposed by Gilbertson (1957) offers a different 
explanation of term premia. Market participants are assumed both to be risk averse and to 
have strong maturity preferences. They would not invest in bonds of adjacent maturities even 
if offered a premium. Thus, even bonds of close maturities are not substitutes of each other. 
Recognizing the excessive restrictiveness of the segmentation hypothesis, Modigliani and 
Sutch (1966) proposed the preferred habitat theory (PH). According to the PH, investors who 
for some reason prefer certain maturities to others may still be induced to invest in other 
maturities if offered a sufficiently large premium.  
Numerous empirical tests of the expectations hypothesis in its various forms have been 
undertaken. While the literature review that follows will mention some of these studies, by 
no means its purpose is to provide an extensive coverage of the literature; this task would 
require a separate paper to be accomplished. Overall, empirical studies have rejected the 
expectations hypothesis more often than they have failed to do so. Also, the EH has been 
rejected more often at the short end of the term structure than for longer maturities. Different 
explanations (discussed later) have been proposed for the failure of the EH. To our 
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knowledge, only one paper (Brown et al. (2004)) has attempted to combine the EH and PH in 
empirical tests. 
 The purpose of this study is to test whether the EH holds at the short end of the term 
structure when preferred habitat is accounted for. The same data will be used as in the 
previous study where we found that the four major world currencies – USD, Euro, JPY, and 
SF – have economically and statistically significant quarter-end and year-end effects 
consistent with the preferred habitat for liquidity in the one-week and one-month LIBOR. In 
the light of our previous findings, preferred habitat in the shortest maturities may contribute 
to the failure of the EH at the short end of the term structure. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Modigliani and Sutch (1966) argue that preference for consumption at certain points in 
time creates “habitats”. Investors can be induced to leave their natural habitats if offered 
higher expected returns. Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR, 1981) argue that it is not preference 
for consumption at different times but the degree of risk aversion that creates liquidity 
habitats. They also show that under stochastic interest rates different term premia cannot 
simultaneously equal zero because of Jensen’s inequality. This implies that different versions 
of the pure expectations theory (which states that all term premia must simultaneously equal 
zero) are inconsistent with one another. Inconsistency in this context implies existence of 
arbitrage opportunities. However, Campbell (1986) demonstrates that different versions of 
the expectations theory, as opposed to the pure expectations theory, may be compatible with 
each other or arbitrage pricing equilibrium. The premia may not equal zero, but may still be 
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constant over time. He also argues that the differences among term premia are second-order 
effects of bond yield variability and are negligible in empirical tests of the theory. 
McCuloch (1993) and Fisher and Gilles (1998) present some counterexamples to the CIR 
proof. They show that traditional forms of the EH can be consistent with the absence of 
arbitrage. They acknowledge, however, that their results are economically implausible.  
Longstaff (2000a) notes that the analysis of CIR (1981) was developed under the 
assumption of complete markets; thus, bonds are redundant securities. Traditional forms of 
the EH can hold without arbitrage in a more realistic case where bond prices exhibit security-
specific variation. This makes the validity of the EH an empirical issue; the EH cannot be 
defied on theoretical grounds. 
Cook and Hahn (1990) provide a survey of the literature on the determinants of the yield 
curve. The studies surveyed in their paper find that over long periods of time the yield curve 
from three to twelve months has had negligible power to predict interest rates three to six 
months into the future. The research in this area suggests that the poor forecasting power of 
the yield curve from three to twelve months is due to substantial variation in the term 
premium at the three- and six-month horizons. 
Hardouvelis (1988), Simon (1990) and Roberts, Runkle and Whiteman (1996) test the 
expectations hypothesis using the effective federal funds rate as the short-term rate and the 
three-month T-bill rate as the long-term rate. They reject expectations with two exceptions. 
First, all of them find that the EH holds during the period over which the Fed targeted 
nonborrowed reserves, October 1979 through October 1982. The second exception occurs 
when Roberts, Runkle and Whiteman (1996) test the EH using only settlement Wednesdays. 
Settlement Wednesday is the last day of the reserve requirement period when banks are 
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required to meet reserve requirements imposed by the Fed. Large spikes in the federal funds 
rate have often occurred on settlement Wednesdays as banks attempt to meet their reserve 
requirements. Both results seem counterintuitive in the light of EH being a proposition about 
predictability of the short-term rate. Indeed, the federal funds rate should be less predictable 
both when the Fed targets monetary aggregates as opposed to the federal funds rate and on 
settlement Wednesdays. 
Thornton (2004a) shows that the counterintuitive results of Roberts, Runkle and 
Whiteman (1996) and other authors are primarily due to the fact that the short-term rate 
appears in both sides of the regression equation utilized in the tests. He points out that the 
results favoring the EH in the case of settlement Wednesday tests are generated because large 
changes in the federal funds rate tend to occur on these days. The results seemingly 
supporting the EH under the monetary aggregate targeting are due to the fact that the federal 
funds rate rose relative to the T-bill rate when interest rates were rising and fell relative to the 
T-bill rate when interest rates were falling. While the exact reason for this is not clear, it 
created a counter-cyclical pattern in the behavior of the spread between the short and long 
rates. That is, the spread between the three-month T-bill rate and the federal funds rate 
tended to widen when interest rates rose and narrow when interest rates declined. It caused, 
in turn, the failure to reject the EH, and not the T-bill rate adjusting in anticipation of funds 
rate movements. 
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997) argue that regression-based tests of the 
expectations hypothesis tend to reject it because of biases that arise in small samples in such 
estimations. The biases are primarily due to high persistence in short interest rates. The 
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authors propose to use bias-adjusted VAR-GARCH models to test the expectations 
hypothesis for short-term rates. 
Hurn, Moody, and Muscatelli (1995) conduct tests of the EH using monthly LIBOR data 
for the Pound Sterling over the period January 1975 through December 1991. Using 
cointegration analysis and vector autoregressions, they find relatively strong support for the 
expectations hypothesis. Cuthbertson (1996), who utilizes weekly data for GBP LIBOR 
(maturities of one week, one, three, six, and twelve months), finds some support for the EH 
except for the six-twelve month pair of maturities.  
Longstaff (2000b) tests the expectations hypothesis at the extreme short end of the term 
structure using U.S. repurchase agreement (repo) rates over the period May 21, 1991 through 
October 15, 1999. Using these data, he tests the following parameterization of the 
expectations hypothesis:  
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where rm is the short (m-period) rate, rn is the long (n-period) rate, and k = n/m is an 
integer. 
In Longstaff (2000b), an overnight repo rate was selected the short rate, while the long 
rates included one-week, two-week, three-week, one-month, two-month, and three-month 
repo rates. The intercept of this model is a constant term premium that need not be equal 
across different maturities n. In the case when the pure version of the expectations hypothesis 
holds, the term premium must not be significantly different from zero. Under the 
expectations hypothesis, bn also should be indistinguishable from zero. Longstaff (2000b) 
finds that the pure expectations hold for the repo rates over the period of his analysis. That is, 
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estimates of an and bn are numerically small and not statistically different from zero. He also 
runs the estimations using the bias-adjusted VAR-GARCH model proposed by Bekaert, 
Hodrick, and Marshall (1997) and arrives at the same conclusion. 
 Brown, Cyree, Griffiths, and Winters (2004) decide to reexamine Longstaff’s (2000b) 
results because they find his result puzzling for the U.S. repo market which is known to have 
a year-end preferred habitat (Griffiths and Winters (1997)). Brown et al. first replicate the 
results of Longstaff for the same data period using both OLS and bias-adjusted VAR-
GARCH model. Their conclusion coincides with the Longstaff’s: the pure expectations 
hypothesis holds for every term repo spread over the overnight repo rate over the period 5/91 
to 10/99. To test whether Longstaff’s results may be generalized to other time periods, 
Brown et al. conduct the same set of procedures on out-of-sample data (relative to the 
Longstaff sample). The data period is from February 1984 to May 1991, which predates the 
Longstaff’s. Repo rate levels, volatility, and term premiums were much higher during this 
period compared to the later sample period used by Longstaff (2000b). The expectations 
hypothesis is soundly rejected for every term in the out-of-sample tests. A closer look at the 
repo data for the period from 1960 through 2003 suggests that the out-of-sample data may be 
more representative of normal market conditions. Analysis of the data over the period that 
follows the Longstaff sample period yields results similar to those of Longstaff, which may 
imply a new interest rate environment. Tests of the EH using daily LIBOR data for the four 
of the major world currencies (USD, Euro, JPY, and AUD) over the period from January 
2001 through December 2002 yield mixed results: the JPY data reject the expectations 
hypothesis. The overall conclusion of Brown et al. (2004) is that Longstaff (2000b) results 
are sample-specific. 
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Downing and Oliner (2004) test the expectations hypothesis in the U.S. commercial paper 
(CP) market. Their data are based on actual transaction prices and cover the period from 
January 1998 through August 2003. Prior to 1998, the Fed collected quotes from commercial 
paper dealers, which the authors suggest might be inferior to transaction-based data. 
Downing and Oliner note that the CP market is characterized by large yield increases at the 
end of the year. They attribute these increases to either window dressing by financial 
institutions, as in Musto (1997), or the desire of CP issuers to lock in longer-term interest 
rates and avoid highly volatile overnight rates immediately prior to the turn of the year. 
Downing and Oliner do not consider the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity as a possible 
explanation of the year-end effect in the CP market. Downing and Oliner report that the year-
end increase in term premia (spreads between term CP and one-day CP) causes the 
expectations hypothesis to be rejected. However, when the year-end effect is controlled for, 
the results are much more supportive of the expectations hypothesis. The dealer-quoted data 
collected prior to 1998, however, reject the expectations hypothesis even after controlling for 
the year-end effect (although the significance of term premia coefficients declines after the 
controls are added). The proposed explanation is that short-term interest rates have become 
more predictable since 1994 (as reported by Lange et al (2003)), although the authors do not 
rule out the lower quality of dealer-quote data contributing to this result. 
According to the expectations hypothesis, a rise in the long rate relative to the short rate 
is due to the expectation of higher short rates in the future. If such predictions are on average 
correct, future short rates would tend to rise, creating a positive correlation of the changes in 
the short rate with the earlier spread. Campbell and Shiller (1991), among others, find for the 
U.S. that the spread predicts the wrong direction in the subsequent long rate changes: an 
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increase in the long-short spread is followed by a decline in the long rate next period. The 
authors find this behavior puzzling: while the movement of future cumulative short rates 
obeys the direction predicted by the expectations hypothesis, the short-run movement of long 
rates does not. Hardouvelis (1994) conducts the analysis for USD, GBP, JPY, CAD, DM, FF, 
and ITL using a ten-year rate as the long rate and a three-month rate as the short rate. He 
finds that in France and Italy the long rate moves in the correct direction. In Canada, 
Germany, Japan, and the U.K., the long rate moves in the opposite direction from the one 
predicted by the expectations hypothesis, but this movement is due to simple white noise and 
is reversed by the use of instrumental variables. In the U.S., however, white noise cannot 
explain the puzzle. The only hypothesis that Hardouvelis considers feasible is the 
overreaction hypothesis stating that short-term interest rates change too much on monetary 
policy announcements and that this error is subsequently corrected. Tzavalis and Wickens 
(1997), among others, attribute the Campbell-Shiller paradox to time-varying term premia. 
Thornton (2004b) provides an econometric resolution to the seemingly paradoxical 
results of Campbell and Shiller (1991). He shows that the tests of the EH that are the most 
popular in empirical work by construction generate results consistent with those of Campbell 
and Shiller when the EH does not hold, whatever the reason. Monte Carlo experiments 
conducted by Thornton support this explanation.  
Patel and Shoesmith (2004) analyze integration among interest rates in Germany, Japan, 
the U.K., and the U.S. and find that the one-month rate generally has little or no influence in 
setting the long-term trend. The authors interpret this result as the consequence of the one-
month rate being much more influenced by monetary policy changes than longer term rates. 
While this may be true, in the context of this study, quarter-end and year-end preferred 
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habitat for liquidity in the short-term maturity may also contribute to the lack of influence of 
the shortest rates on long-term trends.  
In this study, due to rather short data availability periods for very short-term LIBOR 
(maturities below one month), the one-month LIBOR has been selected the short-term rate 
for this study. The long-term interest rates are three-month, six-month, and twelve-month 
LIBOR. Of course, even the longest maturity here would still represent a short-term loan 
when it comes to the traditional classification used by capital market participants. 
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2.3 Methods and Empirical Results 
 
2.3.1 Preliminary Empirical Tests Using OLS 
Until recently, OLS has been a traditional framework for testing the EH. It is well known, 
however, that OLS often does a poor job with time series data, particularly with interest rates, 
due to high persistence in the data. Lately, the literature has been leaning toward the VAR-
based tests of the EH proposed by Bekaert et al. (1997) and Bekaert and Hodrick (2001). 
Acknowledging the shortcomings of OLS, we use it as a starting point for our analysis. The 
EH posits that the long-term rate is determined by the market’s expectations of the short-term 
rate over the life of the long-term rate. To test this assertion, parameterizations of algebraic 
manipulations of the following equation have been used: 
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where  is the n-period (long-term) rate,  is the m-period (short-term) rate,  is 
the constant risk premium that may vary with maturity of the rates, and k = n/m is an integer.  
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One frequently used parameterization of (2) is 
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where 
m
r  is the average short rate over the time span of the long rate. If the EH holds, 
beta will be indistinguishable from one, that is, the spread between the long and short rates 
will not have predictive power for the future short-term rate behavior. If the pure form of EH 
holds, the intercept in (3) must be indistinguishable from zero. The pure EH implies flat term 
structure.   
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A different OLS test of the EH derived from (2) was used by Longstaff (2000b): 
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Here both the intercept and beta must not be different from zero for the pure version of 
the EH to hold; beta must be indistinguishable from zero for the EH to hold. 
We start with running equations of the form (3) and (4) for different currencies. Since our 
goal is to test for the expectations hypothesis in the markets with identified preferred habitat 
(PH) for liquidity, we continue by adding two PH dummy variables, QPH and YPH, to (3) 
and (4). Recall that the spread between one-month LIBOR and longer-term LIBOR for USD, 
Euro, SF, JPY, DM, and ITL increases significantly on the second to last day before the 
maturity of the loan crosses the end of the year and is sustained throughout the third to last 
day of the year. This year-end increase is also statistically significant in GBP, but it is small 
in magnitude. The quarter-end preferred habitat effects in a one-month maturity are much 
smaller; they are significant only for USD and JPY. To account for this behavior in the one-
month LIBOR, we create two dummy variables: QPH, which covers a period of the increased 
spreads preceding the quarter-end, and YPH, covering a similar period prior to the year-end. 
For example, in 1989 QPH for the second quarter is set to one for the period May 30 through 
June 28, while YPH in the same year is equal to one on each trading day from November 29 
through December 27. We separate year-ends from other quarter-ends because the turn-of-
the-year effect in the one-month maturity was found to be much more significant, both 
statistically and economically, than the turn-of-the-quarter effect. After adding the PH 
dummies to the regression model, (3) looks as follows: 
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Given our earlier findings, C2 is expected to be negative for USD, Euro, SF, JPY, DM, 
and ITL, while C1 is also expected to be negative for USD and JPY. Also, C1 is expected to 
be smaller in absolute value than C2. The negative sign is expected because the LHS of (3’) 
should decrease during the period preceding the end of the quarter or year due to the increase 
in the one-month rate, rm. 
Our task is to determine whether the preferred habitat dummies belong to the model and 
whether they have a significant influence on the relation between the short and the long rate. 
For example, the EH may not hold without the PH variables in the model, but may hold when 
they are included. Table 6 contains output for equations 3 and 3’ with the three-month 
LIBOR as the long rate. In order for the EH to hold, the coefficient of the spread between the 
long and the short interest rates must not be different from unity. Thus, p-values of these 
coefficients (betas) reported in Table 6, are for the null hypothesis β = 1. 
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Table 6. The traditional model of the Expectations Hypothesis with and without preferred 
habitat variables. 
Without PH variables With PH variables 
Currency Alpha  Beta Alpha  Beta  QPH YPH 
USD -0.093 0.874 -0.069 0.774 -0.014 -0.159 
 0.000 0.179 0.000 0.017 0.399 0.000 
GBP -0.086 0.799 -0.086 0.800 -0.004 0.013 
  0.000 0.021 0.000 0.021 0.897 0.686 
AUD -0.084 0.955 -0.077 0.954 -0.025 -0.015 
 0.000 0.619 0.000 0.607 0.243 0.529 
DM -0.036 0.593 -0.024 0.558 -0.007 -0.108 
  0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.778 0.005 
Euro -0.052 0.733 -0.039 0.706 -0.011 -0.118 
 0.000 0.013 0.006 0.008 0.631 0.001 
SF -0.066 0.687 -0.050 0.642 -0.022 -0.100 
  0.000 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.413 0.090 
JPY -0.025 0.927 -0.019 0.902 -0.021 -0.016 
 0.182 0.127 0.008 0.044 0.110 0.435 
CAD -0.131 0.932 -0.134 0.929 0.017 -0.008 
  0.000 0.635 0.000 0.622 0.689 0.868 
FF -0.070 1.012 -0.048 1.016 -0.077 -0.038 
 0.015 0.932 0.139 0.910 0.203 0.710 
SP 0.001 1.155 0.013 1.155 0.001 -0.049 
  0.731 0.168 0.720 0.167 0.982 0.396 
ITL -0.008 0.955 0.035 0.942 -0.096 -0.247 
  0.850 0.709 0.491 0.638 0.213 0.038 
The short-term rate is a one month LIBOR, the long-term rate is a three-month LIBOR.  
P-values based on Hansen-Hodrick standard errors are below the coefficients. 
The p-values for betas are for the Wald test with the null hypothesis β = 1.  
Coefficients significant at the 5% level or better are bold; those significant at the 10% level  
but not at the 5% level are bold and italicized. 
 
According to the output of the model without the PH variables, the EH does not hold for 
four out of eleven currencies: GBP, Euro, SF, and DM. It holds for USD, which contradicts 
numerous results from the empirical tests of the expectations hypothesis. When included into 
the model, the year-end preferred habitat dummy is significant for USD, Euro, SF, DM, and 
ITL, while the quarter-end PH dummy is never significant, although its sign is in the 
expected direction. The insignificance of the turn-of-the-quarter dummy variable is 
understandable: the quarter-end PH effect is small and often statistically insignificant for the 
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one-month maturity. Also, when the PH dummies are included into the model, spread 
coefficients of the currencies with pronounced year-end effects deviate further from the 
theoretical value of one, while the intercepts (which reflect the term premia) become smaller 
in absolute value. This further deviation of the spread coefficients from unity leads to the 
rejection of the EH for two more currencies, USD and JPY (even though the PH variables by 
themselves are not significant for JPY, which is surprising). 
According to the output, the EH holds for SP and ITL in its pure form, i.e., with the 
intercept and the coefficient of the spread not being different from zero and one, respectively. 
For AUD, CAD, and FF, the intercepts are different from zero thus rejecting the pure form of 
the EH, but the coefficients of the spread are indistinguishable from one. For these 
currencies, the coefficients of the PH dummies are insignificant, and the presence of these 
variables, as one would expect, does not change the nature of the relation between one-month 
and three-month rates, except for FF (the pure form of the EH holds after adding the PH 
dummies), which is unexpected.  
Longstaff (2000b) estimated the model of the form (4). The long rate is subtracted on the 
LHS from the short rate averaged over the term spanned by the long rate. Under this setup, 
both alpha and beta must be equal to zero for the pure EH to hold. The estimation results are 
in Table 7. Again, the model was estimated with and without PH dummy variables. When 
estimation is done with the PH controls, equation (4) becomes 
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Table 7. The Longstaff (2000b) Test of the Expectations Hypothesis 
Without PH variables With PH variables 
Currency Alpha  Beta  Alpha  Beta  QPH YPH 
USD -0.063 -0.007 -0.055 -0.007 0.000 -0.103 
 0.001 0.087 0.006 0.086 0.994 0.003 
GBP -0.103 0.001 -0.104 0.001 -0.002 0.021 
  0.000 0.895 0.000 0.891 0.938 0.560 
AUD 0.022 -0.015 0.030 -0.015 -0.025 -0.019 
 0.378 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.217 0.317 
DM 0.002 -0.010 0.000 -0.012 0.010 -0.042 
  0.950 0.018 0.946 0.020 0.614 0.281 
Euro -0.027 -0.005 -0.019 -0.005 -0.003 -0.085 
 0.249 0.305 0.403 0.298 0.890 0.013 
SF -0.090 0.002 -0.084 0.002 -0.004 -0.049 
  0.000 0.768 0.000 0.779 0.883 0.391 
JPY -0.029 -0.002 -0.026 0.002 -0.012 -0.002 
 0.000 0.499 0.000 0.498 0.334 0.921 
CAD 0.056 -0.036 0.053 -0.036 0.013 -0.009 
  0.056 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.761 0.830 
FF -0.013 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 -0.077 -0.036 
 0.833 0.432 0.878 0.431 0.198 0.732 
ESP -0.088 0.009 -0.083 0.009 -0.010 -0.056 
  0.373 0.502 0.409 0.498 0.868 0.376 
ITL -0.142 0.014 -0.110 0.015 -0.089 -0.248 
  0.482 0.555 0.577 0.524 0.249 0.050 
The short-term rate is a one month LIBOR, the long-term rate is a three-month LIBOR.  
P-values based on Hansen-Hodrick standard errors are below the coefficients. 
Coefficients significant at the 5% level or better are bold; those significant at the 10% level  
but not at the 5% level are bold and italicized 
 
The results reported in Table 7 are quite different from those in Table 6. For example, the 
EH now holds for GBP and Euro, but does not hold for AUD. This suggests that the 
estimation results are dependent on the parameterization, and that the OLS likely produces 
biased estimations. One similarity with the output from The year-end PH dummy is 
statistically significant for USD, Euro, and ITL. 
The same analyses were conducted with the six-month and twelve-month LIBOR as the 
long rate. Again, conclusions differ depending on the model used. It suggests that OLS may 
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yield biased estimates and that more appropriate techniques should be used to draw better 
conclusions regarding the EH and the influence of PH on it.  
The regressions whose outputs are reported in Tables 6 and 7 suffer from very low R-
squareds and Durbin-Watson statistics close to zero. It suggests high autocorrelations in 
residuals which, if uncorrected, may lead to biased estimates. In the OLS framework, one of 
the following methods may be applied to correct this problem: Cochrane-Orcutt, Hildreth-Lu, 
and maximum likelihood. All three methods were used, and the outputs were then compared. 
Under any of these methods, R-squareds become high (close to unity), and Durbin-Watson 
statistics are around two. However, the data are not fitted well in that intercepts and 
sometimes betas become very large in absolute values. Although the year-end PH dummy is 
significant for each of the “usual suspects” – USD, Euro, SF, and JPY – the results appear to 
lack credibility, and thus are not reported.  
 
2.3.2 Tests of Cointegration 
Cointegration between variables implies that they share common stochastic trends. In 
order for nonstationary variables to have a stable long-term relationship, they must be related 
through at least one linear set of coefficients (a cointegrating vector) that makes the 
combination of the variables stationary. Interest rates are usually assumed to follow an I(1) 
process. That is, the rate series are assumed to be nonstationary with a unit root; taking the 
first difference is needed to obtain stationary series.13 The augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
results suggest that this is mostly true for our data, as interest rate series for ten out of eleven 
                                                 
13 BBA reports annualized interest rates. For all subsequent tests, we use continuously compounded 
equivalents of the annualized rates given by  rc = (12/m)*ln(1+r*(m/12)), where r is the annualized rate, 
and m is maturity in months.  
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currencies are nonstationary with a unit root, while the null of non-stationarity can be 
decisively rejected for the first differences of these series. The only exception is CAD, for 
which the null hypothesis of the unit root can be rejected at the 5% level for all four 
maturities. (Results of these tests are not reported for brevity.)  
Tests of cointegration between the long and the short interest rates may shed some light 
on the nature of the relationship between them. Thornton (2004c) notes that the lack of 
cointegration may suggest that EH is likely to fail. First, if the interest rates are truly 
integrated of order one (I(1)), rejecting the hypothesis of cointegration implies that there is 
no stable relationship between the levels of interest rates, and the EH cannot hold. However, 
the power to reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is low when the root is close to 1. 
That is, it could be that interest rates are actually I(0). If it is true, however, it should not be 
difficult to find evidence of cointegration, i.e., reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
stationary relationship between the short-term and long-term rates. Thus, failure to find at 
least one cointegrating relationship among stationary variables is relatively strong evidence 
against the EH.  
Because there are only two variables in our tests (the long rate and the short rate), the 
maximum possible number of cointegrating vectors is one.14 If the rates are nonstationary but 
cointegrated, one can test the EH by testing the null that the cointegrating vector equals (1, -
1) after adjusting for the constant risk premium and/or a deterministic trend). As Hall, 
Anderson, and Granger (1992) point out, the cointegrating vector of (1, -1) implies that the 
spread between long- and short-term interest rates (1*RL – 1*RS) is the stationary linear 
combination between them which results from cointegration. Rejecting the hypothesis that 
                                                 
14 Chapter 6 in Enders (1995) provides an excellent treatment of the topic of cointegration 
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the cointegrating vector is (1, -1) suggests that the long-run equilibrium relationship is in the 
direction inconsistent with the EH.  
As Thornton (2004c) notes, if the EH does not hold in the long run, it is unlikely to hold 
at frequencies that are of interest to policymakers or financial analysts. On the other hand, 
finding that the EH holds in the long run does not automatically imply that the EH holds at 
higher frequencies. For that to happen, the long-term rate must respond rather quickly to 
changes in the policy rate. That is, failing to reject that the cointegrating vector is (1, -1) does 
not necessarily mean that the EH holds at frequencies that are of interest to policymakers and 
financial analysts. 
Having found that interest rates in our sample are integrated of order one (I(1)), we 
proceed by testing for a unit root in the spread between the long and short rates. As noted 
above, for the EH to hold in the long run, it is necessary that the spread between the rates be 
stationary. Thus, the rejection of the unit root for the spread between long and short rates is a 
necessary condition for the EH to hold in the long run. Table 8 contains the augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics for the spreads between long and short interest rates for 
each currency. The number of lags in the ADF test was chosen using the Akaike information 
criterion. The null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected at the 5% confidence level for all but 
two spreads. For the spreads between the twelve-month and one-month LIBOR in DM and 
AUD, the null of a unit root could only be rejected at the 10% confidence level. The strength 
of cointegrating relations (expressed by the magnitude of the ADF statistics) monotonically 
declines with maturity of the long rate. This result is similar to Thornton (2004c), who finds 
weaker and eventually insignificant relations between the yields of three-month and longer 
term Japanese securities as maturity of the long rate increases. Overall, the long and short 
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rates are cointegrated within each currency in our sample, which implies that they share 
common stochastic trends, while the spreads are stationary. It is consistent with the 
expectations hypothesis holding in the long run; however, it does not necessarily mean that 
the EH holds at frequencies that may be of interest to policymakers and practitioners. 
Table 8. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests of for spreads between  
one-month LIBOR and longer term rates. 
Currency/Long rate 3 months 6 months 12 months 
USD -9.04 -6.44 -4.80 
GBP -6.91 -4.92 -3.34 
AUD -6.30 -4.03 -2.70 
Euro -8.69 -5.83 -4.14 
SF -7.73 -5.65 -3.86 
JPY -7.99 -5.63 -4.25 
CAD -7.56 -5.62 -4.45 
DM -5.80 -3.66 -2.59 
FF -7.40 -5.59 -4.47 
SP -8.72 -6.91 -5.81 
ITL -7.24 -5.50 -3.20 
Note: Dickey-Fuller statistics significant at the 5% level or better are bold; 
those significant at the 10% level are bold and italicized. 
 
Rodrigues and Franses (2003), among others, raise a concern that unit root tests of low-
frequency data, such as daily or weekly, may have relatively low power, that is, a fairly high 
chance of accepting the null of the unit root when it is false. It is not a major concern with 
our data sample since the null of the unit root for spreads has been rejected uniformly across 
currencies at traditional confidence levels. As to the unit root tests for interest rate levels, the 
null of the unit root cannot be rejected for any of the currencies and maturities even at 
extremely conservative levels of confidence. 
Another way to see if interest rates may be cointegrated is to run the Granger causality 
tests. Variable x is said to Granger cause variable z when lags of x enter into the equation for 
z. Granger causality does not imply that one variable causes the other, although it may. The 
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absence of Granger causality, however, implies no cointegrating relations between the 
variables. At least one of them must Granger cause the other if the two variables are 
cointegrated. We find that longer rates for all currencies Granger cause one-month rates, with 
no exception. As to the one-month rates, we only find two exceptions: the one-month JPY 
LIBOR does not Granger cause any of longer JPY rates, while the one-month SF LIBOR 
does not Granger cause the twelve-month SF LIBOR. Thus, Granger causality test results 
suggest that one-month LIBOR may be cointegrated with longer term rates within each 
currency.  
Another weak test of the EH is that the spread between long- and short-term rates 
Granger causes changes in the short rate. This hypothesis could not be rejected at the 1% 
level for any of the currencies or maturities when tested.15
To further examine whether the relations between short and long rates are consistent with 
the EH, it is useful to estimate cointegrating vectors. A cointegrating vector is a certain set of 
non-zero coefficients that makes a combination of variables stationary. Estimated 
cointegrating vectors can shed some light on the nature of the long-term relation between the 
variables. As mentioned above, in order for the EH to hold, the relation between short- and 
long-term rates must be expressed by the cointegrating vector equal to (1, -1), that is, the 
spread between the rates must be stationary. We already found with the help of the ADF test 
that spreads between long and short interest rates were stationary. However, the Johansen test 
(based on the works of Johansen (1991, 1995)) is typically used to estimate the number of 
cointegrating vectors and the vectors themselves for each combination of rates. In the case of 
two variables, there may be at most one cointegrating vector. Since any linear combination 
                                                 
15 The output of the Granger causality tests is not reported to save space. 
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that is a multiple of (1, -1) would also be a cointegrating vector (e.g., (2, -2) or (0.1, -0.1)), it 
is convenient to normalize the vector with respect to one of the variables. For this purpose, 
the coefficient of the short-term rate was set equal to one (nothing of substance would change 
if the coefficients were normalized with respect to the long rate). The output of the Johansen 
procedure can then be used to test (using a chi-square distribution) whether the coefficient of 
the long rate is significantly different from -1 in the cointegrating equation.  
The Johansen tests were performed for 33 pairs of interest rates, three pairs in each of the 
eleven currencies (one-month LIBOR vs. three-, six-, and twelve-month LIBOR). The test 
output suggests that the short rate (one-month LIBOR) is cointegrated with longer rates 
(three-, six-, and twelve-month LIBOR for the same currency) for every currency with 
exactly one cointegrating vector. According to the likelihood ratio test statistic, the 
cointegrating relations are significant at the 1% level for most of the interest rate pairs, with 
the rest of them being significant at the 5% level. Existence of cointegration between short 
and long rates is expected; this result just re-confirms the conclusion of the ADF test which 
could not reject stationarity for the spreads. It implies that there is a long-term relationship 
between long and short interest rates. The number of lags for the Johansen test was chosen 
using the Akaike information criterion. The number of lags does not seem to affect the 
strength and direction of relations between short-term and long-term interest rates in any of 
the 33 pairs. Table 9 presents the output of the Johansen test for all eleven currencies.  
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Table 9. Cointegrating coefficients of the long-term rates. 
Long rate 3m 6m 12m 
Currency       
USD  -0.990   (0.002) -0.982   (0.005) -0.963   (0.011) 
χ2 16.158  [0.000] 12.073   [0.001] 11.422  [0.001] 
GBP -1.000   (0.002) -1.009   (0.006) -1.020   (0.013) 
χ2   0.000   [0.984]  2.427   [0.119]  2.362   [0.124] 
AUD -1.001   (0.002) -1.002   (0.005) -0.987   (0.014) 
χ2   0.495   [0.482]  0.120   [0.729]  0.892   [0.345] 
Euro -1.002   (0.003) -1.007   (0.008) -1.016   (0.015) 
χ2   0.271   [0.603]  0.751   [0.386]  1.088   [0.297] 
SF -0.999   (0.004) -1.011   (0.010) -1.032   (0.024) 
χ2   0.029   [0.865]  1.204   [0.272]  1.840   [0.175] 
JPY -1.003   (0.003) -1.014   (0.006) -1.026   (0.012) 
χ2   1.041   [0.308]  4.711   [0.030]  4.629   [0.031] 
CAD -0.990   (0.003) -0.973   (0.009) -0.936   (0.017) 
χ2   8.623   [0.003] 10.054  [0.002] 14.145  [0.000] 
DM -0.996   (0.004) -0.999   (0.010) -1.010   (0.021) 
χ2   0.755   [0.385]  0.018   [0.894]  0.240   [0.624] 
FF -1.004   (0.004) -1.018   (0.011) -1.033   (0.021) 
χ2   0.895   [0.344]  2.640   [0.104]  2.438   [0.118] 
SP -1.020   (0.004) -1.036   (0.009) -1.050   (0.016) 
χ2  23.950  [0.000] 15.148  [0.000]  9.608   [0.002] 
ITL -1.019   (0.007) -1.030   (0.013) -1.032   (0.021) 
χ2   8.390   [0.004]  5.115   [0.024]  2.356   [0.125] 
Coefficients of the short-term (one-month) interest rate are set to equal one. Estimated coefficients of the 
long rate are in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses next to the coefficients. The null hypothesis is 
that the coefficient of the long rate is equal to -1. The chi-square statistics testing the null are below 
coefficients. They p-values for the chi-square test are to the right of the chi-squire statistics, in square 
brackets. 
 
As is evident from the output reported in Table 9, all estimated cointegrating vectors are 
quite close to -1. However, the null hypothesis that a particular vector is equal to (1, -1) is 
sometimes rejected due to small standard errors.16 Still, the cointegrating vectors are not 
different from (1, -1) for all three pairs of rates in six out of eleven currencies (GBP, AUD, 
                                                 
16 The form of a cointegrating equation with an intercept was also considered. It leads to different 
conclusions sometimes: for example, the long rate coefficients of USD become indistinguishable from -1, 
while those of GBP and AUD become different from -1. We do not report these results because we believe 
that the cointegrating vectors should be estimated without the intercept: the intercepts implies a 
deterministic trends in the data. While interest rates increase or decrease during some periods, no trend 
persists throughout the entire data period for any of the currencies. However, given dependence of the 
results on form of the cointegrating vector, caution should be exercised when interpreting the output from 
Table 9. 
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Euro, SP, DM, and FF). The coefficients of the long-term rate are close to, although often not 
statistically indistinguishable from, -1 in the rest of the interest rate pairs.  
Because this effectively is a joint test of the exact I(1) behavior and the EH, it should not 
be taken as a serious rejection of the EH. Although according to the Johansen tests not all 
cointegrating vectors are indistinguishable from (1, -1), recall that all the spreads were found 
to be stationary, which is consistent with the EH holding in the long run.  On the other hand, 
finding that interest rates are cointegrated with the cointegrating vector indistinguishable 
from (1, -1) only implies that the long-run behavior of rates is consistent with the EH. 
Overall, we can conclude that the EH is likely to hold in the long run for pairs of interest 
rates in our sample. It does not necessarily mean that the EH holds at higher frequencies that 
are of interest for policymakers and analysts. To be useful for them, longer-term rates must 
respond quickly to changes in the market’s expectation of the short-term rate. Definitely, a 
further investigation is warranted to determine whether it happens.  
Next, we estimate the cointegrating equations controlling for the preferred habitat for 
liquidity before the end of the year. Variable YPH, defined as in equation (3’), is entered as 
the exogenous variable when cointegrating vectors are estimated. Overall, its influence is 
reflected in the coefficient of the long rate in the cointegrating vectors becoming smaller in 
absolute value. This is more noticeable in currencies with identified year-end preferred 
habitat for liquidity – USD, Euro, SF, JPY, and DM. The conclusion of the test, however, 
very rarely changes even for interest rates in these currencies. Cointegrating vectors for other 
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currencies are influenced less by the addition of the control variable for the year-end PH. The 
results are reported in Table 10.17  
Table 10. Cointegrating coefficients of the long-term rates (after accounting  
for the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity).  
Long rate 3m 6m 12m 
Currency       
USD  -0.984   (0.002) -0.973   (0.004) -0.946   (0.010) 
χ2 64.860  [0.000] 41.929  [0.000] 29.990  [0.000] 
GBP -1.000   (0.002) -1.008   (0.006) -1.018   (0.013) 
χ2   0.041   [0.840]  1.782   [0.182]  1.805   [0.179] 
AUD -1.002   (0.002) -1.003   (0.005) -0.991   (0.014) 
χ2   0.664   [0.415]  0.294   [0.588]  0.467   [0.494] 
Euro -1.000   (0.003) -1.005   (0.008) -1.014   (0.015) 
χ2   0.001   [0.973]  0.409   [0.522]  0.839   [0.360] 
SF -0.991   (0.004) -0.996   (0.010) -0.995   (0.026) 
χ2   4.432   [0.035]  0.151   [0.697]  0.032   [0.859] 
JPY -1.003   (0.003) -1.010   (0.006) -1.020   (0.012) 
χ2   0.097   [0.755]  2.769   [0.096]  2.732   [0.098] 
CAD -0.990   (0.003) -0.972  (0.009) -0.935   (0.018) 
χ2   8.583   [0.003]  9.803  [0.002] 13.850  [0.000] 
DM -0.990   (0.004) -0.986   (0.009) -0.989   (0.019) 
χ2   7.239   [0.007]  2.284   [0.131]  0.325   [0.569] 
FF -1.004   (0.005) -1.016   (0.012) -1.025   (0.022) 
χ2   0.801   [0.371]  1.903   [0.168]  1.262   [0.261] 
SP -1.020   (0.004) -1.035   (0.010) -1.048   (0.017) 
χ2  22.477  [0.000] 13.850   [0.000]  8.447   [0.004] 
ITL -1.017   (0.007) -1.028   (0.014) -1.030   (0.021) 
χ2   6.281   [0.012]  4.180   [0.041]  1.949   [0.163] 
Coefficients of the short-term (one-month) interest rate are set to equal one. Estimated coefficients of the 
long rate are in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses next to the coefficients. The null hypothesis is 
that the coefficient of the long rate is equal to -1. The chi-square statistics testing the null are below 
coefficients. They p-values for the chi-square test are to the right of the chi-squire statistics, in square 
brackets. 
 
In sum, the analysis of cointegration suggests that interest rates are integrated of order 
one (that is, they are nonstationary (with the possible exception of CAD)), while first 
differences and spreads are stationary. One-month LIBOR is cointegrated with longer-term 
rates within each currency. Estimated normalized cointegrating vectors are sometimes 
                                                 
17 Exogenous variable QPH, covering the quarter-end preferred habitat, had negligible effect on the 
estimation and always was insignificant. It is also true for all subsequent tests in the paper. Thus, we 
exclude it from estimations.    
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statistically different from the theoretical value of (1, -1) but they are always close to it. 
Combining this with the fact that spreads between one-month and longer term rates were all 
found to be stationary (or, more precisely, the null of non-stationarity has been rejected for 
each spread), we believe that there are solid grounds for the expectations hypothesis to hold 
in the long run. Whether it holds in the short run is the question that we attempt to answer 
next. 
 
2.3.3 Tests of the Expectations Hypothesis Using VAR 
Campbell and Shiller (1991) suggested that the EH could be tested using a general vector 
autoregression (VAR), and  Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) made the procedure operational. 
Since a VAR encompasses a wider range of data generating processes than (2), VAR-based 
tests of the EH will be more powerful. The restrictions on the VAR implied by the EH can be 
tested using the procedure of Bekaert and Hodrick. They propose to utilize a constrained 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. Developed by Hansen (1982), GMM 
uses orthogonality conditions defined by the theory to develop tests. The orthogonality 
conditions are based on the assumption of rational expectations, under which a realization of 
a random variable is equal to its conditional expectation plus an error term which is 
orthogonal to the information that was used to form the expectations. 
The VAR takes the form 
(I – Θ(L))yt = ηt  (5) 
for y = (rm, rn)’; here L is the lag operator. GMM estimation imposes orthogonality 
conditions of the form 1),( −⊗≡ ttt xzg ηθ , where xt-1 is a vector formed from stacking lagged 
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values of y, zt is defined as (yt, xt-1)’, and θ is a vector of parameters in Θ (L). Using the 
sample moment condition 
∑
=
≡
T
t
tT zgT
g
1
),(1)( θθ  (6), 
GMM estimation proceeds by choosing θ to minimize the following objective function: 
JT(θ) ≡ gT(θ)’WgT(θ) (7). 
As Hansen (1982) shows, the optimal weighting matrix, W, is a consistent estimator of 
the inverse of  
])',(),([∑∞=
−∞=
−≡Ω
k
k
ktt zgzgE θθ   (8). 
GMM is used to estimate restricted VARs by forming a Lagrangian from the usual GMM 
quadratic objective and a vector of parameter constraints. The Lagrangian is defined 
γθθθγθ )'(()'(5.0),( 1 TTTT aggL −Ω−= −  (9), 
where γ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers and the constraints on θ are represented by the 
vector valued function, αT(θ) = 0. The matrix ΩT is again a consistent estimate of the matrix 
Ω defined above. Denoting the Jacobian of gT(θ) and αT(θ) by GT and AT, respectively, the 
first-order conditions for maximizing θ  and γ  are  
⎥⎦
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The asymptotic distribution of the constrained estimator is derived from these first-order 
conditions. This is done by expanding gT(θ) and αT(θ) around the true parameter value, θ0, 
and substituting these into the first-order conditions above. This leads to a system of the form 
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for . Use of the partitioned inverse formula allows one to argue that the 
constrained estimator, 
TTTT GGB
1' −Ω≡
θ , is distributed as ),0()( 0 TNT Σ→−θθ  for  
1111'11 )( −−−−−− −≡Σ TTTTTTTTT BAABAABB   (12) 
and the Lagrange multipliers are distributed asymptotically as 
( 1'1 )(,0 −−→ TTT ABANT γ )  (13) 
The standard errors implicit in (13) are autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity consistent. 
If the constraints have a noticeable impact on parameter estimation (which means that the EH 
does not hold), the estimated Lagrange multipliers should significantly differ from zero. On 
the other hand, if the EH does hold in the data, the constraints implied by the EH will not 
influence parameter estimates significantly, and the Lagrange multiplier will be 
indistinguishable from zero. The asymptotic distributions given above can be used to show 
that a test that the multipliers are jointly zero can be based on the statistic 
( )γγ '1' TTT ABAT −   (14). 
This Lagrange multiplier statistic is asymptotically distributed as χ2 with l degrees of 
freedom, where l is the number of restrictions. Bekaert and Hodrick (2001) examine Wald, 
Lagrange multiplier, and distance metric tests and conclude that the Lagrange multiplier test 
does best when it comes to testing the null of the EH. It tends to slightly underreject the null, 
while the other two tests are prone to overrejection. 
Maximizing the Lagrangian above may be computationally troublesome, so Taylor series 
approximation to gT(θ) and αT(θ) can be used again to derive a constrained estimate with 
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similar asymptotic properties. Instead of expanding around the true value, θ0, the current 
estimate of the true value, θi, is used to form a better approximation, θi+1. The approximations 
are gT(θi+1) = gT(θi) + gT(θi+1 – θi) and AT(θi+1) = AT(θi) + AT(θi+1 – θi); we can substitute 
them into the first-order conditions for maximization to derive the following iterative 
method: 
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The unconstrained VAR parameter estimates are used as initial conditions. The procedure 
is then iterated until the constraints are satisfied. Because the moment conditions for VAR 
estimation should be uncorrelated over time, ΩT is estimated by 
∑
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evaluating the moment conditions at the unconstrained VAR parameter estimates. 
The constraints that the EH imposes on a VAR can be seen by writing the VAR in the 
first-order form: 
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or simply xt = Θxt-1 + υt.  Note that Et(xt+k)  =Θkxt, so that  for e1 = (1,0,…,0)’. Also note that 
for any two interest rates such that k = n/m is an integer the EH implies that 
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The EH thus can be expressed alternatively as  
∑−
=
Θ=
1
0
'
1
'
2
1 k
i
t
mi
t xek
xe   (19), 
where e2 = (0,1,0,…,0)’. 
The constraints that satisfy the EH are given by 
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Since there is no simple form for the Jacobian of these constraints, the constraints are 
calculated numerically for the use in the iterative procedure described above.  
The above analysis assumes that short and long rates are integrated of order zero, I(0). 
Campbell and Shiller (1987) address the concern that interest rates are not stationary. Their 
test is based on the fact that (2) can be rewritten as 
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where St is the spread between the long and the short rates,  , and ∆mt
n
t rr − m is an m-horizon 
change, that is, ∆mwt = wt+m – wt . Campbell and Shiller propose to estimate a VAR of the 
form 
xt = A(L)xt-1 + wt  (22), 
where  and A(L) is a P-order polynomial in the lag operator L, and to test the 
restrictions implied by (21). Equation (22) can be rewritten as 
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or more compactly as  (24). ttt Axx ω+= −* 1*
Campbell and Shiller (1987, 1991) note that (21) can be rewritten as  
( )( )( )[ ]( ) *11'1 / tmnt xAIAIAInmIAeS −− −−−−=   (25). 
Therefore, the EH can be tested under the assumption that interest rates are not stationary 
by testing the following restriction: 
( )( )( )[ ]( ) 0/ 11'1'22 =−−−−− −− AIAIAInmIAee mn   (26). 
 
Campbell and Shiller (1987) note that (5) and (22) are comparable (wt = ηt) only if the 
rates are cointegrated and the cointegrating vector is (1, -1). In other words, the rates should 
satisfy the necessary conditions for the EH to hold in the long run. Campbell and Shiller’s 
specification allows one to test whether the EH holds at frequencies that are of interest to 
policymakers.  
The starting point is the test of the restrictions implied by the EH without controlling for 
the quarter-end and year-end preferred habitat effects. As discussed above, a VAR in levels 
contains the assumption that the interest rates are stationary. Because, as statistical tests 
suggest, this is most likely not true for our data, VAR-in-differences is a much more suitable 
choice. That is, the set of dependent variables would consist of the first differences (i.e., daily 
changes) of the short and long rates. However, as Campbell and Shiller (1991) notice, 
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estimating a VAR in first differences ( )ntmt rr ∆∆ ,  would lead to a loss of information on the 
relative levels of the short and long rates. Because the EH relates the levels of the short and 
long rates, a test based on a non-level-preserving transformation of the rates cannot be 
considered a true test of the EH. A form of the VAR that does preserve the information on 
the relative levels of interest rates would include a first difference of the short rate and a 
spread between the rates as the two endogenous variables ( )tmt Sr ,∆ . The VAR restrictions 
imply that information at time t, with the exception of the information contained in the 
spread, should not help predict future changes in the short-term rate. We use this 
specification which was proposed by Campbell and Shiller (1987) and was discussed 
above.18
Table 11 reports LM statistics for all 33 pairs of interest rates (one-three months, one-six 
months, and one-twelve months for each of 11 currencies). No exogenous variables, such as 
PH dummies, are included in the VAR at this point. The number of lags in the VAR was 
determined by the Akaike information criterion. The number of lags is in the parentheses 
next to the LM statistics.  
The LM test rejects the EH for most interest rate pairs. The EH could not be rejected for 
any of short-long rate pairs for GBP and for three- and six-month long rates in AUD.19 Our 
preliminary results suggest that, although preferred habitat effects influence the relationship 
between one-month rate and longer interest rates, they do not change the conclusion with 
respect to the EH. The output of Table 11 demonstrates that the EH does not hold for the 
                                                 
18 VARs with daily changes in both rates were also run; the EH was always strongly rejected (results not 
reported).  
19 VARs in levels was run for CAD because Canadian LIBOR was found to be stationary, but these VARs 
are usually unstable. Thus, we report results for VAR-in-differences for CAD in Table 10. Given that it 
may be stationarity, the results for CAD are inconclusive when it comes to testing the EH. 
 91
majority of interest rate pairs when the one-month rate is the short rate, regardless of whether 
the currency exhibits a significant quarter-end/year-end effect in a one-month maturity. Of 
course, we have to be very careful making any conclusions before analyzing the effect of the 
PH variables on the LM statistics for the VARs. 
Table 11. LM statistics for the EH tests, no PH controls. 
       Long rate / 
Currency 3m 6m 12m 
USD     
- LM statistics 14.47  (2) 16.47  (2) 14.65  (2) 
-p-value 0.006 0.002 0.006 
GBP       
- LM statistics 11.42  (5) 9.57  (4) 9.35  (4) 
-p-value 0.326 0.297 0.499 
AUD       
- LM statistics 10.62  (2) 9.178  (4) 6.37  (3) 
-p-value 0.031 0.328 0.383 
Euro       
- LM statistics 30.37  (5) 46.74  (5) 26.38  (5) 
-p-value 0.001 0.000 0.003 
SF       
- LM statistics 31.91 (2) 32.19  (4) N/A 
-p-value 0.000 0.000 N/A 
JPY       
- LM statistics 15.98  (2) 8.23  (2) 103.11  (2) 
-p-value 0.003 0.084 0.000 
CAD       
- LM statistics 11.24 (4) 19.25  (3) 17.74  (3) 
-p-value 0.188 0.004 0.007 
DM       
- LM statistics 27.31  (2) 15.37  (2) 17.69  (3) 
-p-value 0.000 0.004 0.007 
FF       
- LM statistics 26.46  (4) 31.83  (4) 457.62  (4) 
-p-value 0.001 0.000 0.000 
SP       
- LM statistics 23.08  (5) 26.68  (4) 250.38 (3) 
-p-value 0.010 0.001 0.000 
ITL       
- LM statistics 24.39  (2) 65.61  (5) N/A 
-p-value 0.000 0.000 N/A 
Note: the number of lags in a VAR is in the parenthesis next to the coefficient  
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The set of the preferred habitat dummy variables used in the VAR is similar to that used 
in equation (1). When PH dummy variables are added to the VAR, turn-of-the quarter 
dummies are never significant. This is no surprise given that the turn-of-the-quarter effect in 
the one-month maturity was found to be small and often statistically insignificant. Given this, 
we only left the turn-of-the-year dummy variables (BYCR, AYCR, BYEND, and AYEND) 
in the estimation of the VARs. When PH dummy variables are added to the estimation of 
VAR, the procedure often does not converge, i.e., the restricted VAR cannot be estimated. It 
appears that the non-convergence becomes more likely as more variables are added. This is 
not related to the model stability: the largest roots of the unrestricted VARs do not tend to be 
larger than the roots of VARs without PH dummies.  
The non-convergence is interpreted as a rejection of the EH. The iterative method used is 
a modification of the Newton method for numerical optimization. Newton’s method is 
widely known to have good convergence properties when started near an optimum point. It is 
plausible to think that Bekaert and Hodrick’s (2001) modification of it would also have good 
convergence properties near an optimum. Here we start with the unrestricted set of 
coefficients as the initial condition; it appears to be a natural choice. Thus, the non-
convergence of the method is likely due to unrestricted VAR coefficients being “too far” 
from any set of coefficients that satisfy the EH. Hence, we believe that even if a different 
method were able to derive a set of restricted coefficients, their distance from the unrestricted 
set would most likely cause the Lagrange multiplier to reject the EH.  
We next proceed to test the EH using the same procedure (the LM test based on GMM 
VAR estimations) for maturities with no preferred habitat effects, i.e., those that exceed one 
month. Since we use three-, six-, and twelve-month LIBOR in this study, three pairs of short-
 93
long rates can be formed for each currency: three-six months, three-twelve months, and six-
twelve months. These tests do not involve PH variables and will help us determine whether 
the EH holds for pairs of interest rates that involve only maturities longer than one month.  
The output of the tests is reported in Table 12. It is very similar to the output of Table 11 
in that the EH is rejected for the overwhelming majority of short-long interest rate pairs. 
Most of the rejections are significant at the 1% level, with a few more being significant at the 
5% level. The EH is now rejected for GBP, although it held when the one-month rate was the 
short-term rate. The EH for CAD with three- and six-month rates can only be rejected at the 
10% level. For one pair of interest rates - three-twelve months in CAD – the EH could not be 
rejected. Several times (three-six and six-twelve months for JPY, three-twelve and six-twelve 
months for FF and ITL) the unrestricted model could not be estimated due to non-
convergence. Again, we interpret it as a strong rejection of the EH. 
The output reported in Table 12 suggests that preferred habitat for liquidity in the one-
month LIBOR prior to the year-end is unlikely to be responsible for the failure of the EH. 
LIBOR maturities involved in tests whose results are reported in Table 12 do not have 
quarter-end or year-end effects, and yet the EH is strongly rejected by the LM statistics for 
the overwhelming majority of interest rate pairs. 
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Table 12. LM statistics for the EH tests for LIBOR maturities exceeding one month. 
Long rate 6m 12m   Long rate 6m 12m 
Currency/ 
short rate      
Currency/ 
short rate     
USD 3m     CAD 3m    
- LM statistics 27.98  (2) 25.93  (2)  - LM statistics 14.42  (4) 15.24  (5) 
-p-value 0.000 0.000  -p-value 0.071 0.124 
USD 6m     CAD 6m    
- LM statistics  47.23  (2)  - LM statistics  31.97  (5) 
-p-value   0.000  -p-value   0.000 
GBP 3m     DM 3m    
- LM statistics 22.00  (4) 19.94  (5)  - LM statistics 60.63  (2) 20.40  (2) 
-p-value 0.005 0.030  -p-value 0.000 0.000 
GBP 6m     DM 6m    
- LM statistics  21.04 (4)  - LM statistics  56.87  (2) 
-p-value   0.007  -p-value   0.000 
Euro 3m     FF 3m    
- LM statistics 33.46  (5) 16.69  (4)  - LM statistics 18.86  (5) N/A 
-p-value 0.000 0.033  -p-value 0.042 -- 
Euro 6m     FF 6m    
- LM statistics  32.62  (5)  - LM statistics  N/A 
-p-value   0.000  -p-value   -- 
SF 3m     SP 3m    
- LM statistics 40.81  (3) 16.39  (2)  - LM statistics 21.60  (5) 172.12  (2) 
-p-value 0.000 0.003  -p-value 0.017 0.000 
SF 6m     SP 6m    
- LM statistics  113.01  (2)  - LM statistics  73.15  (5) 
-p-value   0.000  -p-value   0.000 
JPY 3m     ITL 3m    
- LM statistics N/A 18.54  (2)  - LM statistics 29.47  (5) N/A 
-p-value -- 0.005  -p-value 0.001 -- 
JPY 6m     ITL 6m    
- LM statistics  N/A  - LM statistics  N/A 
-p-value   --  -p-value   -- 
AUD 3m          
- LM statistics 26.03  (5) 18.38  (5)      
-p-value 0.004 0.049      
AUD 6m          
- LM statistics  40.98  (5)       
-p-value   0.000         
The number of lags in a VAR is in parenthesis next to the LM statistics. 
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2.3.4 Error-correction Models 
If two variables are cointegrated, there is a long-term relationship that characterizes the 
equilibrium state. As we have seen, one-month rates are cointegrated with longer term 
interest rates within each currency. The normalized cointegrating vectors, although 
sometimes statistically different from the theoretical value consistent with the EH, (1, -1), are 
always close to this value. Moreover, the spreads between the one-month and longer-term 
LIBOR are stationary. While the EH appears to hold in the data in the long run, the 
deviations from the long-term equilibrium may persist for too long. It may be the reason why 
the EH has been so decisively rejected by the LM test.  
Given a cointegrating vector normalized with respect to the short rate, (1, -β), the long-
term equilibrium is attained when , that is, when the short rate equals beta times 
the long-term rate. Short- and long-term rates fluctuate in response to stochastic shocks 
causing deviations from this equilibrium state. An error-correction model can be used to 
determine how and how quickly the long-term equilibrium is restored when deviations occur. 
For example, if the deviation is negative (i.e., ), the short-term rate must 
ultimately rise relative to the long-term rate. This gap may be closed in one of the following 
ways: (1) an increase in a short rate and/or a decrease in the long rate, (2) a rise in a long rate 
but a larger rise in a short rate, and (3) a fall in the short rate but a larger fall in a long rate. 
The error-correction model allows to determine the short-term dynamics for restoring the 
long-term equilibrium. If both interest rates are I(1), a simple error-correction model could be 
applied to the term structure: 
0=− ntmt rr β
0<− ntmt rr β
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n
t
m
tn
n
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The terms εm and εn are white-noise disturbances that may be correlated. The term in the 
parentheses represents the previous day’s deviation from the long-term cointegrating 
relationship; over the long-term, it is zero. The two-variable error-correction model described 
by (23) is just a bivariate VAR in first differences augmented by the error-correction terms 
( )ntmtm rr βα − and ( )ntmtn rr βα − . The coefficients αm and αn measure the speed of adjustment 
of the short-term and long-term rate, respectively. The larger the absolute value of αm (αn), 
the greater the response of the short-term (long-term) rate to the previous day’s deviation 
from the long-run equilibrium. Conversely, small absolute values of αm (αn) are a sign of 
unresponsiveness of the short-term (long-term) rate to deviations from equilibrium. Notice 
that the LHS of both equations in (27) is I(0) because the daily changes in interest rates (i.e., 
first differences) have been found to be stationary. In order for the error-correction model to 
be valid, the RHS must also be I(0). In other words, we reemphasize that there must be a 
cointegrating relationship between the short- and long-term rates in order to obtain sensible 
results. This is certainly true about the interest rates in our sample, as all of the interest rates 
series with the possible exception of CAD are integrated of order one, with stationary first 
differences and existing cointegrating relations between short- and long-term rates. The form 
(27) only has the error-correction term but it can and usually does include lagged differences. 
The model can also contain exogenous variables, for example, preferred habitat dummies. 
All regressors must be the same in both equations in order to obtain valid results. 
Table 13 contains parameters αm and αn for each of the pairs of the short-term and long-
term rates for each currency. At this point, no PH dummies are used in the model. The 
number of lags for error-correction models has been determined using the Akaike 
information criterion.  
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Table 13. Speed of adjustment parameters in error-correction models characterizing the 
relations between one-month LIBOR and longer-term LIBOR. 
       Long rate 3m 6m 12m 
  Currency αm αn αm αn αm αn
USD  
 
-0.066  
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.000) 
-0.033 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.012) 
GBP 
 
-0.074 
(0.000 
-0.043 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
AUD 
 
-0.059 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.000) 
Euro 
 
-0.046 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.072) 
-0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.001) 
-0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
SF 
 
-0.043 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.585) 
-0.020 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.708) 
-0.009 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.962) 
JPY 
 
-0.069 
(0.000) 
-0.029 
(0.000) 
-0.038 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
CAD 
 
-0.086 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.000) 
DM 
 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
-0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
FF 
 
-0.090 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.013) 
-0.045 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.000) 
-0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.000) 
SP 
 
-0.368 
(0.000) 
-0.161 
(0.000) 
-0.190 
(0.000) 
-0.060 
(0.000) 
-0.118 
(0.000) 
-0.024 
(0.000) 
ITL 
 
-0.086 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.044) 
-0.056 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.008) 
-0.025 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.000) 
The coefficient of the short-term rate has been set equal to one. P-values are in parentheses below 
coefficients.  
 
As evident from Table 13, the short-term rate’s response to the disequilibrium is in the 
expected direction. The negative sign of αm implies that when , the short rate 
typically decreases (that is, the dependent variable in the first equation of the VAR, the 
change in the short-term rate, is negative). Accordingly, the short rate increases when 
. This is consistent with restoring the long-term equilibrium relationship. 
However, the long-term rate changes in the same direction as the short-term rate, as the signs 
of α
0>− ntmt rr β
0<− ntmt rr β
n’s are also negative.  This means that when the short rate increases to restore the 
equilibrium, the long rate also increases. The magnitude of changes of the long-term rate is 
always smaller, which means that the movement of the long-term rate only partially offsets 
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the movement by the short-term rate to restore the equilibrium. Thus, the long-term 
equilibrium is restored with an increase (decrease) in the short rate and a commensurate 
smaller increase (decrease) in the long rate. In the case of SF, the long-term rates do not 
respond to deviations from the equilibrium, only the one-month rate does.  
Speed-of-adjustment parameters (the alphas) vary noticeably among currencies and 
maturities. For example, the largest αm (in absolute value) is for the interest rate pair of one-
month and three-month LIBOR for SP; it is equal to -0.376. That means that the one-month 
LIBOR for SP responds to the deviation from the long-term relationship by changing by 
more than one-third of that deviation the next day in the direction consistent with restoring 
the equilibrium. However, the three-month SP LIBOR change, expressed by αn, is also quite 
large, a 15.4% of the deviation in the same direction as the short rate, offsetting the move of 
the short rate toward the equilibrium by almost a half. For other currencies, the speed-of-
adjustment parameters are much smaller in absolute values, suggesting that the long-term 
equilibrium is restored much more slowly. For example, in the case of the one-three month 
rates for Euro, only 3.6% of the previous day’s deviation from the equilibrium is eliminated 
the next day (the one-month LIBOR changes by 4.6% while the long-term rate changes by 
1% in the same direction).  
Another easily noticeable characteristic of the output from Table 13 is that the response 
of both short- and long-term interest rates to the disequilibrium lessens as the maturity gap 
between the two rates widens. For example, in the one-three month pair for JPY, the short 
rates’ response is 6.9% of the deviation from equilibrium, and the three-month rate’s 
response is 2.9% in the same direction. However, in the one-six months pair for JPY, the 
one-month LIBOR adjusts by only 2%, and the six-month rate changes by 0.8% of the 
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deviation in the same direction. This behavior is common for all of the currencies. It is likely 
to be a sign of cointegrating relationships weakening as the maturity of the long rate 
increases. It parallels the output of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test reported in Table 8.  
Overall, the slow adjustments of interest rates back to the equilibrium may be the reason 
for rejection of the EH in our data. Although it is not clear what set of the speed-of-
adjustment parameters would lead to non-rejection of the EH, adjustments of the magnitude 
of 3-6% per day may be interpreted as being too slow for the EH to hold when the maturity 
of the short-term rate is only one month.  
As noted above, other (exogenous) variables may be added to the error-correction model. 
We proceed by incorporating turn-of-the-year preferred habitat dummies similar to those in 
equation (1) into the error-correction model. This will allow us to tell whether the speed of 
adjustment back to the equilibrium changes after accounting for the year-end effect in the 
one-month rate. Because the regressors in both equations must be the same, we insert the PH 
dummies into both equations in (27). These dummies are expected to have insignificant 
coefficients in the equation for the changes in long-term rate since three-, six-, and twelve-
month rates do not have preferred habitat effects. The error-correction model will look as 
follows: 
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     (27’). 
Panel A of Table 14 reports the speed-of-adjustment parameters along with the turn-of-
the-year dummy coefficients from the error-correction model. The PH dummy coefficients 
contained in Panel B are from the first equation in (27’) with the three-month LIBOR as the 
long-term rate. Of course, the coefficients of these variables for the one-month rate change 
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from the other two models (with six- and twelve-month LIBOR as long-term rates) are very 
close to those reported in the table.  
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Table 14. Speed of adjustment parameters in error-correction models for pairs of short-term 
(one-month) and long-term LIBOR (the turn-of-the-year dummies included). 
Panel A. Speed-of-adjustment parameters 
       Long rate 3m 6m 12m 
  Currency αm αn αm αn αm αn
USD  
 
-0.052 
(0.000) 
-0.020 
(0.000) 
-0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.012 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
GBP 
 
-0.072 
(0.000 
-0.041 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.000) 
-0.017 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.000) 
AUD 
 
-0.065 
(0.000) 
-0.039 
(0.000) 
-0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.000) 
-0.011 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.002) 
Euro 
 
-0.046 
(0.000) 
-0.010 
(0.052) 
-0.026 
(0.000) 
-0.009 
(0.001) 
-0.014 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.000) 
SF 
 
-0.026 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.810) 
-0.014 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.892) 
-0.006 
(0.027) 
0.000 
(0.798) 
JPY 
 
-0.068 
(0.000) 
-0.029 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
CAD 
 
-0.083 
(0.000) 
-0.042 
(0.000) 
-0.035 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
DM 
 
-0.031 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.143) 
-0.016 
(0.000) 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
-0.009 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.028) 
FF 
 
-0.116 
(0.000) 
-0.048 
(0.000) 
-0.056 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.030 
(0.000) 
-0.008 
(0.000) 
SP 
 
-0.320 
(0.000) 
-0.143 
(0.000) 
-0.153 
(0.000) 
-0.049 
(0.000) 
-0.094 
(0.000) 
-0.019 
(0.000) 
ITL 
 
-0.094 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.001) 
-0.059 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.001) 
-0.027 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.000) 
Panel B. Turn-of-the year dummy variable coefficients  
 BYCR AYCR BYEND AYEND   
  USD  
 
0.258 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.196) 
-0.191 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
(0.001)   
  GBP 
 
0.032 
(0.050) 
-0.013 
(0.418) 
-0.032 
(0.048) 
0.040 
(0.016)   
  AUD 
 
0.023 
(0.052) 
0.009 
(0.456) 
0.001 
(0.912) 
-0.019 
(0.095)   
  Euro 
 
0.111 
(0.000) 
0.028 
(0.043) 
-0.032 
(0.019) 
0.009 
(0.503)   
  SF 
 
0.172 
(0.000) 
0.023 
(0.151) 
-0.117 
(0.000) 
-0.027 
(0.070)   
  JPY 
 
0.048 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.327) 
-0.084 
(0.000) 
-0.013 
(0.180)   
  CAD 
 
0.053 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.774) 
-0.036 
(0.061) 
-0.002 
(0.934)   
  DM 
 
0.159 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.124) 
-0.094 
(0.000) 
-0.028 
(0.031)   
  FF 
 
0.053 
(0.256) 
0.084 
(0.068) 
0.043 
(0.348) 
0.114 
(0.018)   
  SP 
 
-0.029 
(0.851) 
0.025 
(0.870) 
-0.046 
(0.762) 
-0.011 
(0.943)   
  ITL 
 
0.109 
(0.207) 
0.029 
(0.737) 
-0.173 
(0.046) 
-0.120 
(0.191)   
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The coefficient of the short-term rate has been set equal to one. P-values are in parentheses below 
coefficients. 
 
Results reported in Table 14 suggest that the addition of the turn-of-the-year dummies 
almost does not change the speed-of-adjustment parameters. The coefficients of variables 
BYCR and BYEND are significant for USD, Euro, SF, JPY, and DM, as expected. They are 
consistent with the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity in these currencies. They are also 
statistically significant (although much smaller in magnitude) for GBP and (marginally) for 
CAD. These coefficients are interpreted as changes in interest rates (e.g., 0.26 means a 26 
basis point increase in the one-month USD LIBOR).20  
 
                                                 
20 One can argue that the PH dummies used in (23’) do not cover the entire period of increased short-term 
rates. To address this concern, we conducted the same tests using YPH (which covers the entire period of 
increased one-month rates prior to the year-end) instead of these dummies. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 14.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
Empirical studies suggest that the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest 
rates is often rejected, especially at the short end. There are many possible reasons for this 
rejection: time-varying risk premia, irrationality of market participants causing failure of 
rational expectations, overreaction of market participants to monetary policy changes. In the 
light of our earlier findings, preferred habitat for liquidity in the short-term rate may also 
contribute to the failure of the EH at the short end of the term structure. However, our results 
suggest that, although the year-end preferred habitat for liquidity certainly has influence on 
short-term (one-month) interest rates in major world currencies, it is not responsible for the 
rejection of the expectations hypothesis for the major world currencies.  
The one-month LIBOR is cointegrated with longer-term (three-, six-, and twelve-month) 
LIBOR maturities within each currency. It implies the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
between short- and long-term interest rates. However, the interest rates appear to move too 
slowly to restore the long-run equilibrium. Short-term and long-term rates tend to move in 
the same direction, with the magnitude of the short-term rate movements exceeding that of 
the long-term rate movements. This means that when the short-term rate moves to restore the 
long-term equilibrium, the long-term rate tends to partially offset it by moving in the same 
direction. This slow restoration of the long-term equilibrium may cause the failure of the 
Expectations Hypothesis in the short run.  
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